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The demographic transition in Russia was accelerated by several social cataclysms 
during the “Soviet type” modernization. Frequent changes in the timing of births and 
marriages engendered a mass “abortion culture”. Contraceptive devices of poor quality 
were produced on a limited scale. The Soviet regime promulgated pronatalism and 
considered contraception to contradict this ideology. There have been two waves of 
government policy interventions. In the 1930s and 1940s restrictive and propaganda 
measures prevailed. These failed to yield serious effects. In the 1980s, policies aimed at 
lessening the tension between full-time employment and maternal roles. These 
generated shifts in birth timing, namely shorter birth intervals and earlier second and 
third births, however increase in completed cohort fertility was minimal. A third wave 
started in 2007. Preoccupied with continuous depopulation, authorities intend to boost 
births by substantially increasing benefits. The mid-1990s was a turning point in the 
change of fertility and nuptiality models. The 1970s birth cohorts marry and become 
parents later. They delay first and second births and increasingly begin partnerships 
with cohabitation. Contraception is replacing abortion. New attitudes and perceptions 
about family, partnership, childbearing, and family planning are emerging. A major 
transformation typical for developed countries, the Second Demographic Transition, is 
underway. Nevertheless, many neo-traditional features of fertility and nuptiality remain. 
These distinguish Russia from most European countries and will persist in the near 
future. Completed fertility, however, hardly differs from the average European level. 
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1. Introduction: Russia’s Population at a glance  
Russia had a population of 143,474 thousands on 1 January 2005. The overall 
population decrease for 2004 was 694 thousands or –4.8 per 1000 of the mid-year 
population. This decrease took place because of a surplus of deaths (2,295,000) over 
births (1,502,000), amounting to 793,000 which was not compensated by the positive 
international migration balance of 100 thousand or 0.7 per 1000 (including all official 
corrections for underreporting of immigrants). The population has been decreasing 
since 1993; the natural increase has been negative since 1992, making up –6.6 per 1000 
in 2000–2002. In 1993–2004, Russia’s population decreased by 5,087,000. In the 
1990s, the first years that followed the breakdown of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, an increase due to migration was quite substantial, 6.7 per 1000 (1994). To a 
large extent, this compensated for a growing negative natural decrease and mitigated 
the population decrease. The restrictive migration policy of recent years has reduced the 
number of immigrants, while complicated bureaucratic procedures of registration 
increased the proportion of illegal migrants residing in the country.  
Russia can be described as a mono-ethnic country, with 80% of the population 
being Russians. The other ethnic population groups making up at least 1% of the overall 
population are Tatars (3.8%), Ukrainians (2.0%), Bashkirs (1.2%), Chuvash (1.1%), 
Chechens (0.9%), and Armenians (0.8%). Foreigners, including those without any 
citizenship and those not declaring citizenship, are 1.9% (the 2002 Census). 
Russia is a country with a quickly ageing population. In 1970, the median age was 
30.5; in 2005 it was 37.3. In 1990, the population aged 65+ made up 9.9% and the 
youth aged 0–19 accounted for 29.9%. By comparison, in 2005, the population aged 
65+ made up 13.7% and 23.8% were youth aged 0–19. The single cause of the ageing 
population is low fertility of an under replacement level beginning with cohorts of 
women born in 1911 (net reproduction rate for synthetic cohorts has remained below 1 
since 1965). There have been no signs of improvement in life expectancy in older ages 
for many decades, while improvements in child mortality helped slow ageing.  
The real tragedy for Russia lies in the more than thirty-year deterioration of the 
mortality situation for those of working age, especially men.  According to the present 
mortality tables, 47% of males who reach their 15
th birthday will not survive to age 60. 
(In Western Europe, the US and Japan no less than 85% do).  The major cause of such 
egregious Russian backwardness is the exceptionally high mortality from all types of 
external causes and early mortality from cardio-vascular diseases.  A reduction in male 
and female work-age mortality to the level of the developed countries of the West could 
reduce the negative natural growth of the population by 0.5 million, which is more than 
60%.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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In an address to the Russian Federal Parliament (in May 2006), President Putin 
said the issue of raising fertility is central in finding a way out of this demographic 
crisis. A new demographic policy, which took effect in 2007, is based on the idea of 
stimulating fertility. Another policy, which concerns replacement migration and aims at 
improving public health, is not articulated clearly at the official level. The debate over 
boosting fertility and the necessity of attracting migrants is going on at all levels: 
among experts, in the mass media, and among legislative and executive authorities. 
 
 
2. The First Demographic Transition towards a two-child family: 
overcoming an inefficient model of fertility and family policy  
A steady fall in the birth rate in Russia began at the very end of the 19
th century, when a 
radical schism in the social, economic and political system of the Russian Empire 
gathered force, following the abolition of serfdom in 1861.  Cohorts born in the 1880s 
and socialised at the turn of the century were the first to start out on the path of fertility 
limitation.  The First World War – and the revolution, civil war and famine which 
followed – provided an additional impetus to the acceleration of the demographic 
transition.  
During the entire first half of the 20
th Century, a rapid and often brutal 
modernization took place and traditional peasant society played the key role in the 
transformation of reproductive behaviour patterns. Starting much later than in most 
Western countries, and from a higher level, Russia’s fertility transition was also much 
more rapid.  A decline in cohort fertility in Russia was monotonic within the whole 
period of the demographic transition (see also Scherbov and Van Vianen 1999, 
Scherbov and Van Vianen 2001). Only the cohorts born between 1890 and 1895 – 
utilising the short breathing interval produced by the favourable conjuncture of the 
1922–1928 New Economic Policy periods – show some interruption of this trend (Fig. 
1, Appendix, Table 1).  
In contrast, period fertility (the conventional total fertility rate) exhibits strong 
fluctuations against the backdrop of a generally declining trend. The fluctuations in 
period fertility reflected particular societal events: catastrophic changes in the 
socioeconomic environment (World Wars I and II, the 1918–1920 civil war, massive 
repressions during the 1930s, famines in 1932–1933 and in 1947) and the intrusion of 
the government into the demographic sphere (e.g. adoption of new family policy 
measures in the 1980s), all of which caused major changes in birth timing. Sharp falls 
and subsequent– no less sharp – compensating rises in period indices are good signs of 
immediate changes in the tempo of family formation in response to sudden changes in 
macro factors, and at the same time, they mask any major trend in fertility change.  In Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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the case of introduction of policy incentives, naturally the reverse sequence is observed: 
a rise and then a compensating drop.  
 
Figure 1:  Completed cohort and period fertility (PTFR) during the  
demographic transition in Russia (average number of children born 
to a woman by age 50: birth cohorts 1841–1970, period 1897–2000 – 



































































Source: Zakharov S.V. (2005).  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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The first demographic transition in Russia came to an end in the 1960s (mothers 
born between 1920 and 1930). The convergence of total fertility in the cohort of 
“mothers” and the cohort of their “daughters” can serve as a good indicator of the 
completeness of the transition process. Cohort and period total fertility converged in 
level, and spatial fertility variation narrowed, which also testifies to the completeness of 
the transition to a new type of fertility, one in which the average family has no more 
than two children (Zakharov 1994, Avdeev and Monnier 1995, Zakharov 2003).  
To a substantial degree the transition to low fertility in Russia was accelerated by a 
series of continued social cataclysms/crises which went hand in hand with the 
modernization of Russian society.  The point is that not only did living standards fall 
during the crises, but individual control over reproductive behaviour became a 
widespread practice among the mass of the population. Partners had to continuously 
adjust their reproductive practices to changing socio-economic reality. The necessity of 
frequent changes in the timing of births and marriages brought about the specific tools 
and measures of fertility control. In Russia, unfortunately, it led to widespread 
prevalence and long persistence of abortion as the major means of limiting family size. 
One may say that during the Soviet period there was a mass “abortion culture” (see 
David ed. 1999: 23–39, 241–242) in which abortion was considered an “unavoidable 
evil,” and alternatives to which did not exist in order to, firstly, achieve the desired 
small number of children (no more than two) in the absence of another instrument – 
contraception – and secondly, for the necessary adjustment of  family plans 
immediately in response to sharp changes in the social environment, which occurred all 
too often in the first half of the 20
th century. It should particularly be noted that the 
Soviet authorities never allowed any other population ideology than pronatalism 
(Ivanov et al. 2006), and implicitly considered contraception to contradict this ideology. 
If in the 1920s the obvious dilemma – abortion or effective contraception – was still 
discussed among experts, especially among medical specialists, who even carried out 
research on the development of contraceptive means which was pioneering for that 
period (Avdeev et al. 1995), then from the beginning of the 1930s and right up to the 
1970s the question of the crowding out of abortion by contraception was never posed 
on a practical level. Until quite recently most if not all medical experts considered the 
Pill more dangerous than abortion (Rivkin-Fish 2005: 99). In connection with this, 
despite the absence of a direct ban, contraceptive devices were produced for decades in 
the Soviet Union on a very limited scale and were of poor quality (Popov et al. 1993).  
The chronic short supply was only eased in the 1980s, in part by imports of mostly the 
Intrauterine Devices (IUD), following the introduction of a special unpublicised 
programme of the USSR Ministry of Health (Avdeev 1994). 
The decision to ban abortion in 1936 (except when the mother’s health was 
directly threatened) lay on the same pronatalist plane (Avdeev et al. 1995). The Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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initiators of that law did not use any sort of argumentation whose roots could be found 
in ethical or religious norms (see discussion in: Blum 1994: 159–180). The main 
argument for the ban on abortion, in their opinion, was that “socialism has removed all 
limits which existed under capitalism for the growth of fertility among the labouring 
masses and therefore there is no longer the necessity to resort to abortion”. One cannot 
accuse the authorities of the absence of formal logic, inasmuch as decrees from 1920 
on, allowing abortion upon a woman’s request, referred to the temporary character of 
these measures, for the period when “moral hangovers of the past and burdensome 
economic conditions” were still in effect (Blum 1994: 166–167). The covert motive of 
the authorities was the hope for an additional source of growth in births before the 
coming 1937 population census, which inescapably would reflect the serious 
consequences of collectivization, repression and famine for the growth of the 
population. 
The period of the ban on abortion (1936–1954) did not bring any tangible 
dividends in the sense of growth in fertility:  the trend in the cohort fertility rate did not 
even react to this situation, and the growth in the TFR in the second half of the 1930s is 
mainly explained not by the ban on abortion but rather by compensating mechanisms 
coming after calendar year shifts in the fertility of specific cohorts,   produced by 
collectivization and famine in the first half of the 1930s.  At the same time, negative 
consequences made themselves known swiftly and operated during the entire period of 
the ban: the number of maternal deaths doubled, the proportion of deaths from abortion 
among such deaths exceeded 70%, and murders of children under one year of age as a 
proportion of the overall number of murders more than doubled; in the urban population 
it went from 6% to 14%, and in Leningrad reached 25% in 1940 (Sakevich 2006). 
There is every reason to presume that, despite the fact that abortion became an illegal 
and criminally prosecuted practice for both sides – the pregnant woman and the 
abortionist – it continued to become more widespread in correspondence with the 
decline in fertility. 
The ban on abortion was only part of the general measures aimed at halting the fall 
in fertility. In 1936–1937, the state doubled expenditures on maternity wards and 
preschool care, and introduced monthly allowances for mothers with seven or more 
children.  In November 1941, following the example of the Horty regime in Hungary 
(1940), a tax was introduced for bachelor males and married women without children.  
Later, in 1944, the liberal law on marriage introduced in 1927, which allowed tribunals 
to recognize legal rights for cohabiting couples, was repealed, and divorce became more 
complicated and beyond the reach of most couples. According to the 1944 law, a 
mother giving birth to a child outside of marriage did not have the right to apply to the 
court to receive child support from the father of the child. On the birth certificate of a 
child born out of wedlock, the place for information about the father was crossed out, Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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which meant deprivation of the right to bear the father’s surname. In this way, the status 
of “illegitimate” child was restored, a status which had existed in the Russian Empire 
and was eliminated immediately after the revolution. In addition, allowances for third or 
higher order births, and for children aged 1 to 4 years, were created. Maternity leave 
was increased from 9 to 11 weeks. Also, a series of six medals was created for mothers 
with 5–10 children. These medals conferred certain material advantages on their 
holders, such as preferential positions on waiting lists for kindergartens, summer 
children camps, and housing, as well as priority in queues in shops. 
However, all of these measures (prohibitive and incentive) were aimed not at 
supporting the great bulk of families, but rather at reconstructing the former “ideal” 
type of family – spouses in a lifelong legal marriage, not regulating the number of their 
children – which was swiftly disappearing before one’s eyes  as a social and statistical 
phenomenon. Therefore, the measures had neither any sort of serious influence on the 
dynamic of completed fertility nor did they transform the final parity distribution of 
mothers. The ideal of the two-child family as a central reference point, dictating a 
change in the level of fertility, swiftly strengthened its position, and high fertility was 
marginalized.  After the War, particularly after the death of Stalin, social dissatisfaction 
with restrictive laws in relation to divorce and children outside of marriage arose 
quickly. However, the repeal of these laws occurred only in the middle of the 1960s 
with the adoption of the new family code of laws. 
In the course of the First Demographic Transition in Russia, only two categories of 
women increased their proportionate weight:  those with two children and those with 
one child. Importantly, women with two children outnumbered those with one, 
beginning with women born in the second part of the 1920s (Fig. 2, Appendix, Table 2). 
The proportion of women giving birth to seven or more children continuously declined. 
The share of women with three to six children varied: in the first stage of the 
demographic transition, this share rose and subsequently declined. The fluctuating 
pattern of change in this proportion of women mirrors the statistical regularity of the 
transition from a traditional type of fertility (high with no regulation at the family level) 
to a contemporary model (low with widespread  birth control at the individual and 
family level) in a socially heterogeneous population. 
One finds that the strongest stability is characteristic of the proportion of childless 
women (those who did not produce any live births).  An increase in this proportion, 
which considerably exceeds the level of natural physiological infertility (3% to 7% 
according to various estimates), occurs only in cohorts of women born in the first 
decades of the 20th Century: 10–15% of these cohorts of women had no children 
(Appendix, Table 2). The unfavourable population structure by age and sex, as well as a 
tight marriage market, all of which are products of social cataclysms, account for this. Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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The major reference point for the first demographic transition is the arrival of the 
two-child family (the data on the distribution of women by ever-born children support 
the idea of the existence of this model at a population level). Marriage cohorts seek to 




Figure 2:  Change in the distribution of women by number of children ever born  

























ce: Zakharov S.V. (2006b).   
 
 
The change in parity progression ratios indicates that within the whole period of 
the demographic transition, a family with three to four children has been the least 
popular (the decrease in probability of birth of the third and fourth child was swift and 
the greatest in magnitude), (see also Avdeev and Monnier 1995, Scherbov and Van 
Vianen 2001). The probability of a first birth has remained rather stable until very 
recently – that is, until the cohorts born in the late 1970s (Figure 3; Appendix, Tables 3 
and 5). 
Thus transition from high to low fertility in Russia did not so much reflect as it did 
represent the step-by-step process of change in the social norm for fertility:  many Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
http://www.demographic-research.org 915 
children, medium number of children, few children.  The demand for a medium number 
of children – 3 to 4 live-born in the course of a life – evidently  did not exist historically 
as a mass social norm, neither in traditional society nor in the course of the 
demographic transition,  nor even more so after the transition.  
 
 
Figure 3:  Ultimate parity progression ratios: Russia, female birth cohorts 1868– 























Source: Zakharov S.V. (2006b).  
 
At the end of the day, what is important for family and society is not the number of 
children to which an average woman can and actually does give birth, but how many of 
them survive to socially significant ages, are socialized and come to replace their 
parents (that is effective fertility).  A decrease in inefficient fertility is the essence of the 
first demographic transition.  The Russian experience provides good evidence of this. 
While the completed fertility of cohorts in Russia fell by a factor of six in the 
course of the demographic transition, effective fertility, measured by the number of 
children still alive at age 20, declined by just one child per woman, from three to two 
children (Appendix, Table 6).  The improvement of social control over infant and child 
mortality has contributed to the gradual convergence of total and effective fertility at 
the desirable level of two children.  Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Within the first demographic transition, the expanded replacement of generations 
has been replaced by a simple or slightly narrowed one. The proportion of women who 
gave birth to one girl who survived to age 28, and thus ensured replacement, kept on 
growing in the course of the transition, reaching 43% in cohorts born in the 1950s and 
the1960s (Appendix, Table 7). Those who failed to ensure their replacement by the next 
generation (did not have at least one girl surviving to age 28) made up a highly stable 
and large proportion of 30% to 40% over the 20
th Century. For selected generations of 
women (born between 1909 and 1923), we can observe that this proportion rose above 
40%: a rapid fertility decline in these generations was not accompanied by an 
appropriate reduction of mortality. 
There is a major question about the prospect of ensuring replacement in the future. 
Beginning with cohorts born in the second part of the 1960s, the tendency towards 
under-replacement gathers momentum. 
Over the previous hundred years, Russia has moved from a traditional type of 
reproduction, with accidental and practically unpredictable reproductive outcomes for 
individuals and their families, to a situation in which the uncertainty of reproductive 
outcome is minimal for an individual, and unreasonably high for society at large. Russia 
did not have the historical experience of supporting a regime of simple, let alone 
expanded, reproduction of a generation after child mortality became low, and control 
over fertility became the universal practice.  
 
 
3. The crisis of the age pattern of fertility and the second government 
attempt to prevent the ongoing fertility decline  
The First Demographic Transition in Russia ended by the late 1960s, with the TFR 
dropping to 1.9–2.0. It was one of the lowest levels then reported in the world, and, at 
this level, could be compared with only a few countries such as Finland, Sweden, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia. Russian cohorts born in the late 1940s 
experienced completed fertility of 1.83 –1.86 live born children per woman. 
It should be noted that in a series of modernising features, Russian society 
significantly overtook many Western societies. It is well-known that in full accord with 
the principles of “socialist modernisation”, female employment in social production in 
Russia, as in other countries “east of the Berlin wall”, increased more vigorously, and  
mass transition to a two-income family occurred earlier in Eastern Europe. Women’s 
access to professional, including higher, education, was also easier here. 
Correspondingly, public forms of preschool education for children developed more 
actively. The liberalisation of divorce and abortion upon request of the woman took 
place on average earlier than in western countries. As a result, Eastern European Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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countries confronted the problems of “dual employment” (or double burden) of women 
earlier, with the conflict between widening equal gender rights in the extra-familial 
sphere and gender inequality in the family. All of this, of course, had an effect in that 
fertility in the majority of the countries of Eastern Europe after the Second World War 
reached low levels earlier than in the majority of countries of Western Europe. 
Throughout the 1970s, the level of fertility in Russia remained more or less stable. 
At the same time, a remarkable process of change in the age pattern of fertility was 
occurring which, as is well-known, resulted in Western and Eastern Europe going in 
different directions, with specific regard to the rejuvenation of the age pattern of 
fertility and nuptiality (see also Avdeev and Monnier 1995, 1996). Since the late 1960s, 
Western countries, one by one, have been giving up the early and universal marriage 
pattern, and quite rapidly increasing the age at marriage and childbearing. This is 
actually an ongoing process (the Second Demographic Transition). In contrast, Eastern 
European countries have experienced nothing similar, with such countries as Russia and 
its neighbours in the European part of the former USSR, and a number of then-
communist countries, gradually moving towards younger and younger ages at marriage 
and birth. By the 1980s, the contribution of mothers under age 25 to the overall number 
of births rose to an extremely high proportion. In Russia, for example, more than 50% 
of the cohort and period TFR was contributed by mothers at these ages, and by the age 
of 28 to 30, the number of children in a family ceased to grow (Appendix, Tables 8–
11).  By age 25, about 80 % of women had been married at least once (Avdeev and 
Monnier 2000).   
Up to the beginning of the 1990s, the tendency to form a family at younger ages 
prevailed in Russia. The contribution of mothers under age 25 to the TFR exceeded 
60%, while the input of the youngest mothers – under 20 – rose to 17–18%.  
The reason for such an outstanding rejuvenation of fertility and marriage lay in 
changes in the premarital sexual behaviour of youth.  Sexual debut and subsequent 
regular sexual relations occurred at increasingly younger ages, which was rarely 
recorded in Russian local studies and not encouraged by the authorities at that time 
(Golod 2005). Since knowledge of effective contraceptive behaviour and the actual use 
of contraceptives among young men and women were at an extremely low level, an 
early sexual debut automatically led to the growth of premarital conceptions, which in 
turn gave rise to early marriage and lowered the mean age of motherhood. In Russia in 
the 1960s to 1980s, traditional morals connected with the joint start of sexual life, 
entering into marriage and the birth of the first born were still preserved.  Negative 
attitudes to premarital cohabitation of young people fully corresponded to these morals 
and to mass aversion to artificial interruption of first pregnancies.  Therefore the change 
in the age pattern of fertility flowed out of the shift to freer premarital sexual conduct. Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Early marriage fulfilled the function of legalizing early sexual relationships and covered 
up the obvious fact of “the Fall”, or the unplanned pregnancy. 
Thus, the roots of the convergent and then divergent movement of  temporal 
models of fertility in the countries of Western and Eastern Europe in the 1960s to 1980s 
lay in one and the same process: liberalization of sexual morals.  At first, the sexual 
revolution in both parts of Europe caused a lowering of the age of entry into marriage 
and the age of motherhood.  Later, as the contraceptive revolution gathered force, the 
situation was corrected in the Western countries, and the age model of fertility there 
began to grow older.  The sexual revolution in Eastern Europe, in comparison with the 
countries of the West, proceeded more quietly and less noticeably to the observer, by 
virtue of the taboo placed on the theme for research and the more than simply limited 
depiction in the mass media.   But, in fact, it had a no less radical character.  Unlike that 
in the Western countries, the sexual revolution in Eastern Europe was not accompanied 
by the parallel process of the contraceptive revolution. Moreover, in East European 
countries, and first of all in Russia in setting the ideological direction, there was an 
artificial brake by the state on transition to effective contraception. Only perhaps in 
Hungary and some republics of the former Yugoslavia was policy in the field of family 
planning in conjunction with the fight against abortion relatively more pragmatic.  From 
this flowed various consequences for the model of fertility and marriage in Western and 
Eastern Europe: in the course of two decades at one and the same level of overall 
fertility, the age at childbirth moved in opposite directions on opposite sides of the 
Berlin wall.  Moreover, family policy, adopted as a weapon in different years in the 
then-communist countries, last of all in 1981 in the USSR, acted in the same direction: 
it supported earlier-begun/earlier-completed childbearing and universal marriage. 
We systematise here the key qualitative and quantitative parameters of this model 
of fertility which Russia approached at the moment of change of the political and socio-
economic system at the beginning of the 1990s. 
 
 
3.1 Key quantitative characteristics of the Russian fertility pattern in the 1970s 
and 1980s  
The proportion of childless women is extremely low – 4–7%. On average, family 
formation in terms of number of children begins at early ages and terminates rather 
swiftly – the mean age of mother at first birth is 23 years old, at second birth – 26–27. 
80% of women born in the 1960s had contracted their first marriage by age 25, while 
their contribution to the completed cohort fertility by the same age was 60%. By age 30, 
this cohort had given birth to 85% of the total number of their children. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
http://www.demographic-research.org 919 
The interval between first marriage and first birth was, on average, about a year 
(given current mean age at first marriage and first birth), which implies that first birth 
was not postponed. Moreover, it is very likely that the timing of the first birth was not 
regulated at all. As the relevant studies show, more than 50% of pregnancies occurred 
before marriage. 
The attitude towards a two-child family was relatively strong – close to 50% of 
women by the end of their life had two children (App. Table 2), and the parity 
progression ratio for those with one child was 71% (App. Table 3). On the other hand, 
the proportion of mothers with three and more children was not higher than that for 
only one child (16–18% versus 27–30%). As a result, cohort completed fertility 
averaged 1.9 (App. Table 2). 
The interval between first and second births was less than four years, between the 
second and third 2.5 years, between the third and fourth, 1.5.  The tempo of family 
formation was greater for those who chose to have more than two children, as well as 
for those who did not practice birth control on a regular basis (that is, some marginal 
groups). 
The parity progression ratio for third, fourth, and fifth birth orders was much the 
same and was about 25–27% for those with one child fewer than the given birth order. 
 
 
3.2 Qualitative characteristics of the Russian fertility pattern in the 1970–80s  
Some features of a traditional pattern were preserved: obligatory marriage; a strong link 
between sexual and matrimonial behaviour; outdated practices of family planning 
among youth; pre-marital pregnancy as a stimulus for marriage; a high tempo of family 
formation at young ages; no signs of voluntary childlessness; and, virtually no 
regulation of the timing of first births. Thus, sexual life, marriage, and childbearing 
were not viewed as separate values, but rather as concurrent events.  
There were transitional features associated with modernization, such as the 
prevalence of a two-child family ideal, while there was still a considerable proportion 
who desired more children (largely associated with the ethno-cultural diversity of the 
population of Russia). 
The pattern was not based on economic rationality. Coping with everyday life for a 
family with children was not possible for young parents without outside financial and 
other kind of assistance: the young family’s income was not enough to ensure the 
necessary consumption.  That is, the help of grandparents, the extended family of other 
relatives, and the state were all necessary.  Thus the first steps towards “grown-up life” 
were connected not with the obtainment of economic independence but rather with the Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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creation of a family and the birth of a child. Consequently, poverty took on the 
character of a “vicious circle” and hardly anyone broke out of this. 
The pattern was not based on social rationality. The possibility of acquiring more 
than a higher or a secondary school level of education was seriously constrained 
because the time when people normally continue their education coincided with the 
early stages of family formation. Advancement in professional skills was also limited, 
particularly for women. Thus, early family formation increasingly conflicted with the 
values of higher education, professional career, and gender equality. 
The pattern was not based on demographic rationality. As there were virtually no 
births after 30, fertility was very low and the period of possible reproductive life was 
not used to the full extent. The high prevalence of unintended births led to “shot-gun” 
marriages (caused by an accidental pregnancy), to high intra-family tension in young 
families, to conflicts with relatives, and, accordingly, to a high risk of divorce – the 
probability of divorce in Russia was one of the highest in the world. As surveys 
showed, a divorced mother with one child was less likely to give birth to a second child 
than was a married mother.  
The pattern was not rational in terms of individual and public health. In order to be 
able to complete childbearing at a young age, partners need to use effective 
contraception for a long period of time. The risk of abortion in such a situation is high, 
and even higher in a country like Russia with a virtual lack of family planning. Modern 
contraception was either not available or not encouraged by official public health 
authorities (the Pill), or in short supply (IUD), or of very poor quality (the condom). In 
addition, both female and male sterilization was prohibited. Russia was an excellent 
example of the prevalence of an abortion culture in which overall birth limitation was 
much more important than the spacing and timing of conceptions and births. The 
reproductive health of the Russian population was poor, with a high level of 
pathologies, including after-abortion infections and more serious complications. 
It was absolutely clear that the persistence of such a pattern into the future was 
unacceptable, as it failed to meet the requirements of a modern society whose values 
include good education, high-quality skills, and high standards of consumption. The 
rationalization of individual behaviour, above all that of Russian youth, was inevitable.  
However, before the transformation began, there was a period of a temporary 
“baby boom” from 1981 to 1990, associated with the implementation of a new variant 
of pronatalist policy measures.  
The theoretical foundations of the new policy in the family field were actively 
worked out by specialists in the USSR in the mid-1960s, when it became evident that in 
the European part of the country a below-replacement fertility rate had been firmly 
established. Various recommendations for altering the situation and increasing the 
fertility rate were widely discussed throughout the 1970s in the scientific literature, in Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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the press, and at a multitude of professional conferences, with all of this public 
discourse finally reaching the ears of the political leadership. The 24
th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union/CPSU (1971) declared that an unsatisfactory 
demographic situation had developed in the country, and the 25
th CPSU Congress 
(1976) set the task of working out “an effective demographic policy”. The 26
th CPSU 
Congress (1981) indicated the concrete future of political intervention: financial and 
material assistance to young married couples and families with children; improving 
housing conditions; increasing the accessibility and quality of preschool establishments; 
widening the possibilities for part-time employment; and, work at home for women and 
the introduction of partly paid leave to look after small children. The proclaimed policy 
did not, however, establish concrete quantitative parameters as goals to fulfil for 
fertility.  
The basic innovative measures in family policy were introduced in stages: from 
November 1981 in Siberia and the Far East, and also in the territories of the European 
North, and from November 1982 in the remaining areas of Russia. Maternity leave on 
full pay was extended from 77 to 112 days (then to 126 days in 1990). Several options 
were introduced for child-care leave:  a) 18 months of leave on full pay to take care of a 
sick child; b) leave with about 20% of the average wage from the end of maternity leave 
to the day the child reached 18 months; and c) unpaid leave to look after children from 
18 months to 3 years. Moreover, a parent looking after a child was guaranteed the right 
to part-time employment or to work at home. Women with children under 14 in all 
enterprises and establishments were to have the choice of working a full or less than full 
working day, including a flexible hourly or weekly work schedule.   
A number of measures introduced earlier continued to be operative, such as: a 
benefit for poor families, a one-time childbirth benefit graded by birth order, a special 
tax introduced during the Second World War (1941) for childless unmarried men and 
unmarried women.  
Finally, the 1981 policy provided a whole series of subsidies for a special 
category: “mother of many children” (mnogodetnaya). This provided a whole set of 
advantages: reducing the time needed to obtain housing, easing access to consumer-
durable goods in short supply, cutting queuing time in shops, which was critically 
important in the prevailing conditions of short supply of every sort of everyday product, 
and so on. Moreover, mothers who raised at least five children to the age of eight were 
supposed to have a reduction in pension age.  
In 1991–1992 the pronatalist policy of the state in fact ended, as the result of 
galloping inflation as much as because of the more general reason: the political and 
financial-economic system of the Soviet state ended its existence. Thus the overall 
duration of this family policy can be determined as ten years. Among the most 
important measures, in our view, the following should be singled out:  Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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•  lengthy maternity leave, partially paid, with previous employment guaranteed for 
three years;  
•  introduction of two types of child allowances, both as a lump sum and on a regular 
monthly basis;  
•  some changes in housing policy and granting to families with children some 
benefits in the difficult consumer market. 
•  The extension of the status of mother/family of many children to those with three 
children was also important.  
 
 
3.3 The Demographic Effect of the 1980s Family Policy  
The reaction of the population to the innovative measures was practically instantaneous. 
The TFR increased from 1.89 in 1980 to 2.11 in 1983 and to 2.22 in 1987. TFR then 
started to fall quickly, decreasing to 1.37 in 1993. The dynamic of the period 
progression ratios for first to sixth order births shows that the probability of birth of 
children of the first three orders increased – the probability of the fourth and subsequent 
children continued to decrease. The indicator for second births displayed the greatest 
growth (Zakharov and Ivanova 1996). 
However, if we pass from period to cohort indicators, we can only with difficulty 
observe any visible successes in the family policy of the 1980s. 
The generation which was in its active child-bearing years in the period the 
measures were operative did not show an increase in completed cohort fertility.   
(Zakharov and Ivanova 1996; Avdeev, Monnier 1995; Zakharov 2006d).  It should be 
noted that it is entirely possible that these measures prevented a further decline in 
cohort fertility. Basically the demographic effect of family policy was in fact reduced to 
calendar year shifts in births of actual generations (a timing effect). 
We illustrate what has been said with the data itself.
2 The two panels of Figure 4 
show the proportion of mothers who have given birth to two or more children, 
presenting cumulative totals for the indicated age for real and synthetic cohorts.  In the 
first panel the curve relates to two synthetic cohorts (calendar periods): 1980, that is, up 
to the introduction of the demographic policy measures, and 1987, when the growth of 
the current-year indicators of fertility reached their peak.  In the second panel, two birth 
cohorts are presented: the cohort of females born in 1954, whose fertility was affected 
by the influence of the demographic policy measures only at later ages (by the end of 
1983 they had reached the age of 30), and the cohort born in 1960, whose fertility was 
most directly affected by the policy measures.  
                                                           
2 The data presented were calculated by the author by constructing full parity-specific fertility life tables for 
real and synthetic cohorts. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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Figure 4:  Cumulative proportion of women giving birth to a second child  
  at the indicated age, per 1000 women: period life tables for 1980  
  and 1987 (top panel) and life tables for 1960 and 1954 birth cohorts  



























































Source: Zakharov S.V. (2006).  Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Comparison of the two panels demonstrates the gravity of error possible in 
analysis of the effectiveness of demographic policy measures which depend on 
indicators of a hypothetical generation. According to the period fertility table for 1980, 
it might be expected that 25% of women will have had two or more children by the age 
of 25, 51% will have had two or more children by the age of 30, by age 35, 61% and by 
age 40, 64%, which fully corresponds to the actual rhythm of fertility of the 1954 
cohort. The table for 1987 reflects the destabilising character of the demographic policy 
measures – expectations have sharply increased: by the age of 25, 33% of women 
should already have given birth to two or more children, 61% by age 30, 72% by age 
35, and 76% by age 40.  It is not surprising that the total fertility rate (the indictor 
summarising fertility of a hypothetical generation) jumped from 1.89 in 1980 to 2.22 in 
1987. However, not a single actual generation followed the “optimistic” schedule 
shown by the fertility table for 1987. 
The birth timetable for women of the 1960 birth cohort differs in a significant 
fashion from the timetable for women born six years earlier. In the 1954 cohort, 23% of 
women had given birth to at least two children by age 25, 51% by age 30, and 64% by 
age 35. In the 1960 birth cohort, the corresponding figures are 29%, 57%, 64%. This 
means that representatives of the younger of these two cohorts gave birth to their 
second and successive children on average one to three years earlier than their older 
contemporaries.  However, by age 35, despite the powerful start of the younger cohort, 
the cumulative proportion of women with two and more children was equal for both 
cohorts.  
Completed cohort fertility was to some extent influenced by the social policy 
measures of the 1980s, shown in Table 2. The indicators presented in the final column 
of the table do not allow us to speak about any sort of significant success of this policy, 
i.e. about any increase in the ultimate number of children born. The single indisputable 
effect which can be observed is the change of the timetable of births, expressed in the 
“rejuvenation” of fertility of a whole series of cohorts.  
It is interesting to ask which social groups reacted most to the family policy 
measures. Official statistics do not allow breakdowns by social group in the analysis of 
fertility in Russia.  Therefore, we use data from the nationally representative sample 
study of the “Gender and Generations” Programme (GGS), carried out in 2004
3. 
 
                                                           
3 All Russia representative sample Survey was conducted by the Independent Institute of Social Policy 
(Moscow) with the financial support of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation and the Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft, Germany. The design and standard survey instruments of the GGS were adjusted to the Russian 
context by the Independent Institute of Social Policy (Moscow) and the Demoscope Independent Research 
Center (Moscow), in collaboration with the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Rostock, 
Germany). Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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Table 2:  Mean number of children born by age 25, 30, 35 and 50, to the 1954– 
  1966 female cohorts  
 
Mean number of children born by the given age  Year of birth of 
cohort  25 30  35  50   
1954 0.94  1.45  1.78  1.90 
1955 0.95  1.49  1.83  1.89 
1956 0.95  1.54  1.85  1.88 
1957 0.94  1.50  1.78  1.87 
1958 0.96  1.53  1.77  1.87 
1959 0.96  1.56  1.77  1.87 
1960 0.99  1.60  1.77  1.84 
1961 1.02  1.59  1.74  1.80 
1962 1.03  1.55  1.70  1.76* 
1963 1.04  1.50  1.65  1.72* 
1964 1.05  1.47  1.62  1.69* 
1965 1.07  1.44  1.59  1.67* 
1966 1.07  1.39  1.56  1.65* 
 
Source: Zakharov S.V. (2006) updated.   
Note: *Preliminary estimate using data up to 2005. The actual magnitude will most probably be somewhat higher, in light of the 
tendency of fertility to increase at older ages, as observed in the most recent years. 
 
 
It is well-known that the strongest socially differentiating characteristic for 
demographic behaviour in Russia are place of residence – cities or rural areas – and 
educational level.  The GGS questionnaire unfortunately established the place of 
residence and the educational level achieved only at the moment of the survey: the 
corresponding retrospective characteristics at the moment of childbirth are not available 
to us.  However, the error which may arise in connection with this can scarcely have a 
significant impact on the conclusions.  
We will be comparing the 1950–1954 birth cohort, all of whom reached the age of 
30 to 35 years at the moment the new family policy was launched, and whose fertility 
was not influenced by the policy measures in younger ages. The fertility of the 1960–
1964 cohort was influenced to the greatest degree by the new family policy.  Table 3 
shows the cumulative value of the parity progression ratios from first to second births 
for a given age for women living in population points of different status. Table 4 
contains the same indicators, but for women of differing educational levels. The general 
conclusions about the influence of family policy in the 1980s on the selected social 
groups may be summarised as follows: This policy did not bring about a significant 
change in the ultimate level of fertility, which is in accord with the conclusions reached Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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through analysis of the macro-statistical data. For the entire population as a whole, 
neither the aggregate probability of birth of a first nor a second child rose, and the 
aggregate probability of a third birth even declined somewhat. 
The policy slightly raised the aggregate probability of birth of a first child in 
regional centres and to mothers with a high level of education and the probability of 
second births in provincial cities and to women with a high level of education. The 
probability of a third birth increased only in provincial cities. 
The policy to a significant degree accelerated the formation of families in all social 
groups, primarily due to the birth of the second child at a younger age, which in practice 
meant a widespread and significant shortening of the interval between the first and 
second births.   
The policy for a short time levelled social distinctions in the calendar of births: the 
tempo of family formation in the cities strongly increased and came as close as possible 
to the tempo in rural areas; the tempo of family formation in women with higher than 
average educational status came closer to the tempo of family formation of women with 
a lower than average educational status. 
 
 
Table 3:  Parity Progression Ratios of women with 1 child, by type of  
settlement, by age 20, 25, 30, and 35: Russia, cohorts 1950–54 and 
1960–64, per 1000  women  
 
Birth cohort and   By age 20  By age 25  By age 30  By age 35 




















































Source: Author’s estimates based on Russian GGS (2004) data. 
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Table 4:  Parity Progression Ratios of women with 1 child, by educational level,  
by age 20, 25, 30, 35 and 40: Russia, cohorts 1950–54 and 1960–64, 
per 1000 women  
 
Birth cohort and   By age 20  By age 25  By age 30  By age 35  By age 40 
education*  Transition to second parity (1Æ2) 
1950–54 
















































Source: Author’s estimates based on Russian GGS (2004) data. 
Note: *Secondary education includes elementary vocational education; post-secondary includes middle and higher professional 
education, and advanced research programmes. 
 
 
Thus, the demographic effect of the policy did not manifest itself in an increase in 
average family size in any major social group, but rather in an increase in social 
homogeneity in the model of fertility timing dominant in Russia. Fertility over all 
became even younger than before, above all for inhabitants of large cities and 
populations of high educational status, for whom the timing effect showed itself most 
strongly.  
Apparently the major innovative measure which had the greatest significance for 
change in the timetable of births was that of child-care leave, giving fully employed 
women the possibility to bring a desired second child into the world at an exceptionally 
young age and with the shortest interval after the birth of the first child.  It should be 
noted that the bulk of women with high educational status in Russia are teachers and 
doctors (these spheres of employment in Russia are almost entirely female), for whom a 
long leave with preservation of one’s position at work plays a particularly important 
role in creating good conditions for motherhood. A sharp reduction in the interval 
between the first and second child is also explained by the introduction of such 
measures as child-care leave.  A significant fraction of women in fact extended their 
leave to look after the first child in connection with the birth of the second child (the 
more so in so far as they used all of the three-year leave).  The average magnitude of 
the interval between the first and second births in the 1980s was shortened by almost 
two years – from 5.5 years to 3.5 years measured as a period indicator (Figure 5), and 
by at least 1.5 years for cohorts (Figure 6). Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Figure 5:  Average interval between first and second births, years: Russia, 1947– 
  1993 (calculation carried out for women with an interval between the  
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Source: Author’s estimates based on Russian GGS (2004) data. 
 
 
Figure 6:  Average interval between first and second births: Russia, selected  
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Source: Author’s estimates based on Russian GGS (2004) data. 
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On the one hand, the policy of the 1980s offered improved opportunities for 
childbirth and bringing up children, namely for the most advanced social groups, and it 
is entirely probable that it prevented a further decline in Russia for some period of time. 
On the other hand, however, the policy only temporarily postponed the final destruction 
of the traditional model of early family formation, which by that time was already going 
through a crisis and did not have a long-term future.  In the new socio-economic 
conditions of the Transition Period in Russia, such a model of fertility and family 
formation had even less chance for survival, given that the previous dependence on the 
paternalism of the parents’ family and the state was no longer possible.   
 
 
3.4 Family and population policies in the 1990s and 2000s  
The economic and political reforms which had gathered strength in the middle of the 
1990s triggered the transformation of marital and reproductive behaviour in the 
direction of an increase in the age of entry into marriage and the birth of children. At 
the same time, in the 1990s, no new initiatives in the area of family policy were put 
forward. The government supported a liberal economic model and the actions of the 
state in the area of social policy, under the pressure of powerful budget limitations, 
came down to reactive measures for ameliorating the most acute problems: pensions, 
enmployment and poverty (Eatwell et al 2000). Attempts to preserve the real value of 
the packet of family benefits and other payments for children in conditions of high 
inflation were timid, delayed and on the whole extremely unsuccessful. Expenditure on 
family allowance as a percentage of GDP dropped from 2% in 1991 to 0.36% in 2000; 
family allowance as a percentage of total household income decreased from 5.6% to 
1.2%, respectively (A Decade of Transition 2001: 43). In 2004 these indicators fell even 
lower – 0.28% and 0.4%.  
In President Putin’s budget address  to the Federal Assembly (May 2006), a 
demographic theme occupied the central place.  Priorities and solutions to the problem 
were placed by the President in the following order:  reduction of mortality, increase in 
the attractiveness for immigration to Russia, and an increase in the birth rate. At the 
same time, the main accent was placed on the necessity to stimulate the birth rate, 
beginning in 2007.  At the end of 2006, the legislative and executive organs made all 
necessary decisions and, in 2007, the new measures came into force. First of all, there 
were significant increases in the size of the basic forms of benefits:  
The maximum size of pregnancy and childbirth benefits came to 16,125 roubles in 
2007, as compared with 11,700 in the period 2003–2006.  In general, maternity leave is 
paid for 70 days at 100% of the woman’s monthly salary (the average nominal salary in 
Russia in 2006 was about 11,000 roubles). Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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The one-off payment at the birth of a child was set at 6000 roubles from 1 January 
2006, paid out of federal sources (between 1997 and 2000, it was 1,250 and in the 
period 2002–2005, it was 4,500 roubles). However, at the regional level, starting in 
2005, an additional benefit was paid, determined by the regional administration (for 
example, Moscow has the maximum benefit for Russia, which is tied to the annually 
determined official subsistence minimum in that city: for the first child, it is five times 
this minimum (25,000 roubles in 2007) and for the second, a multiple of seven, and for 
the third and subsequent children, ten times this minimum.  
From 1 January 2007, the monthly maternity leave benefit for up to 1.5 years was 
established at 40% of the recipient’s average wages, but not less than 1,500 roubles for 
the first child and 3,000 for the second and subsequent children, payable also where the 
mother was unemployed, but not more than 6,000 roubles a month (in 2000, 167 
roubles; in 2002, 500 and in 2006, 700 roubles, independent of birth parity but on 
condition of employment history). 
The monthly federal benefit for children from 1.5 to 16 years of age (for those 
remaining in studies up to the age of 18) was repealed in 2005 (at that time, it was 70 
roubles). From 2006, this is the prerogative of the regional authorities, who set differing 
levels (usually 100 –200 roubles) and some regions established the size of the benefit 
depending on birth parity and/or family income.  In 2007, there was a recommendation 
to increase this benefit, which in fact occurred.  For example, in Moscow the benefit, 
initiated on 1 January 2007, is paid only to families with a per capita income lower than 
the subsistence minimum (5,100 roubles in January 2007), and is 300 roubles (in 2006, 
it was 150 roubles), and for single mothers, 750 roubles (in 2006, it was 300 roubles).  
Thus the size of the benefit was significantly increased but the basic system of 
measures did not undergo any significant change, if one does not consider the 
continuing tendency to strengthen the role of regional authorities and their financial 
responsibility for family policy. 
The single innovative measure of “Putin’s policy” was the introduction of the so-
called “maternal capital”. This specified that 250,000 roubles ($9,600 or 7,200 Euros at 
the exchange rate of March 2007) be paid to a special individual account for mothers 
who gave birth or adopted a second child starting in January 2007. The measure also 
includes mothers who have not previously made use of this benefit and who have a 
third or subsequent child.  The non-cash benefit is paid once in a mother’s life and may 
be spent only three years after the birth of the child, via an account and for one of the 
following purposes:  private education for a child of any parity; obtaining housing in 
the Russian Federation; or, the formation of the investment part of a pension. Partial 
expenditure of “maternal capital” is allowed per calendar year and in any proportion for 
the established purposes. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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It is important to note that the authorship of “maternal capital” as an innovative 
measure is unknown in expert circles.  Not one of the variants of the conceptions 
worked out for “Demographic Policy in the period 2015–2020”, presented to a wide 
circle of specialists for expert evaluation in 2005–2006, mentioned this measure. A 
conception of demographic policy itself was adopted by the Russian government and 
signed by President Putin in October 2007. Thus, all the measures which came into 




4. Signs of the Second Demographic Transition: A Quiet Revolution 
in Family Formation in Russia since the mid-1990s  
By the middle of the 1990s, signs of inevitable change in the Russian fertility pattern 
under discussion emerged, and arguments were made that Russia was on the threshold 
of the Second Demographic Transition (Zakharov and Ivanova 1996, Katus and 
Zakharov 1998, Zakharov 1999, Zakharov 2000). 
Criticism develops around the fact that the available Russian data do not offer firm 
foundations for conclusions about the start of “westernization” of fertility in Russia: 
official marriage at an early age remains the only form of union and cohabitation is not 
widespread among Russian youth. The first child is unplanned, as was the case 100 
years ago, and having children is not postponed to a later age (Barkalov 1999, Avdeev 
and Monnier 2000, Mills 2004).  The fact that fertility decline in the first half of the 
1990s had a quantum effect (Philipov and Kohler 2001) is frequently linked, 
exclusively, to the economic crisis, deteriorated standards of life, and cultural shocks 
rather than to the beginning of a fundamental transformation of the model of family 
formation itself.  It should be noted that there is not enough empirical data to verify “the 
crisis hypothesis”, either (Kharkova and Andreev 2000, Kohlmann and Zuev 2001, 
Kohler and Kohler 2001). 
It was not very long before the newest trends gathered strength and naturally 
debunked most of the critical remarks. Today it is impossible to doubt that the middle 
of the 1990s was a turning point in Russian fertility and nuptiality models.  The 
economic growth beginning in 1999 and the consequent improvement in living 
standards in Russia (which today has nearly returned to the level prevailing at the start 
of the reform), was accompanied not so much by an increase in the birth rate, which 
was hoped for by the proponents of the “crisis” interpretation of the previous decline, 
but more as a strengthening of the structural changes in the model of family formation.  
The latest research, based on the panel observations of the Russian Longitudinal 
Monitoring Survey/RLMS (Roshсhina 2006) and on the first wave of the Russian GGS Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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(Maleva and Sinyavskaya 2006), indicate that the probability of an actual birth and the 
intention to have a first and second child in Russia are practically unrelated to factors of 
economic rationality (income, female employment). At the same time, the high 
significance of socio-cultural determinants and values are confirmed, which today are 
undergoing a powerful change in the direction of individualism. 
In the industrialized world, the second demographic transition manifested itself in 
the generation born in the 1950s and 1960s. The former Yugoslavia (republics of 
Slovenia and Croatia, specifically) and Hungary were pioneers in this process among 
the Eastern European countries, with the cohorts of the 1960s leading.  At least 
reducing the contribution of young mothers to completed fertility. The fertility 
postponement process in these countries started somewhat earlier than in other former 
socialist countries (Appendix, Table 12, see also: Sobotka 2002, p.14–15, Philipov 
2004, p.2, 11). In Russia, no changes were observed before the cohorts born in the first 
part of the 1970s (Appendix, Tables 12, 14). 
The Russian cohorts born in the 1970s and more recently, whose socialization had 
already begun in the “new, post-Soviet Russia,” tend to differ from their parents. They 
marry and become parents at more mature ages (fig. 7, 8, 9, Appendix, Tables 14–17). 
They delay the first and the second birth (Appendix, Table 18). They increasingly 
prefer to begin a partnership with cohabitation rather than with legal marriage. Family 
planning becomes more effective, i.e. contraception replaces abortion. 
 
Figure 7:  Age-specific fertility rates, per 1,000 women: Russia, 1980, 1985, 1990,  






























Source: Author’s calculations based on unpublished official data  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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Figure 8:  Age-specific fertility rates per 1,000 women: Russia, female birth  






























Source: Author’s calculations based on unpublished official data  
 
 
Figure 9:  Cumulative fertility by age, per 1,000 women: Russia, female  
  birth cohorts 1949–50, 1955–55, 1959–60, 1964–65, 1969–70,  
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Data from the current registration of marriages, results of the 2002 Population 
Census and research carried out in the GGP Programme convincingly demonstrate that 
in Russia over the past two decades a “quiet revolution” has taken place with respect to 
the institution of legal marriage: the age at first marriage is increasing; cohorts of 
Russians born in the first half of the 1960s and later increasingly begin living together 
with a partner outside a legal marriage, i.e. cohabitation [“unregistered marriage”] is 
gradually crowding out the traditional form of marriage (Appendix, Tables 13, 17). 
It cannot be said that cohabitation before marriage was not widespread in Russia. 
On the contrary, in the generations of Russians born before the war and, in the 1950s, 
establishing their families, up to 20% of men and women under the age of 30 began 
their first partner union with a non-marital relationship. Moreover, the tendency for an 
earlier start in partnership relations, as discussed above, was accompanied by a steady if 
slow growth of informal unions among youth (Figure 10). It is very probable that the 
family policy interventions of the 1980s are responsible for the drop in the proportion 
of those who began a first partnership with cohabitation in the 1955–1965 female 
cohorts. A legal marriage tended to bring more rewards.   
However, among representatives of the cohorts born after 1960, the spread of 
informal unions take on an explosive character. Today, up to 25% of women by the age 
of 20, and up to 45% by age 25, do not register a marriage with their first partner.  Data 
for men confirm these figures – 40 to 45% of first unions today are informal unions.  
Informal relations (consensual unions) at the start of living together have the 
temporary character of a trial marriage for the majority. After some period of time for 
many couples the relationship becomes fully respectable and it is legally formalized in a 
marriage. At the same time, the RusGGS data indicate that registration of marriage in 
Russia is increasingly not simply postponed to a time when the stability of the 
relationship is proven, but does not happen at all (Figure 11). If in the cohorts born in 
the 1950s, 50% had already registered a marriage with their partner less than a year 
from the start of a consensual union, then in the cohorts born in the second half of the 
1970s, this figure is 30%. The indicator also declines for those who live together a long 
time. Not long ago 70% of partners registered their marriage by the third year of a 
consensual union. Today it is 50%. By the fifth year of family life, the reduction is 
more than 10 percentage points. We note that if the relationship is not formalized within 
3–5 years of living together, the chances the marriage will be registered at some time in 
this partnership are minimal: there is virtually no difference between the percentage of 
registered marriages by the fifth and the tenth year from the start of relations. 
Can it be surprising, then, that the proportion of non-marital births doubled during 
the last 15 years, amounting to one-third of the total number of births? Childbearing 
out-of-legal marriage is becoming socially acceptable at all ages and in all social strata: 
age-specific probabilities of giving birth to a child outside of marriage among mothers Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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aged 20+ have become almost equal in the last 15 years (Appendix, Table 20). Non-
marital pregnancy is losing a pusher role in contracting a marriage.  
 
 
Figure 10:  Cumulative percentage of women who had, by the specified age,  
entered a first partnership which was a consensual union: Russia, 





















































Source: Author’s estimates based on Russian GGS (2004). Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Figure 11:  Cumulative percentage of women whose first partnership was a 
consensual union later converted into marriage, by the time since 
start of first partnership: Russia, birth cohorts  
 





















by 1st year by 3rd year
by 5th year by 10th year
 
Source: Author’s estimates based on Russian GGS (2004). 
 
 
Over the last ten years, the fertility of women under age 20 in Russia has halved 
(Appendix, Table 10), which indicates that a radical change in the behaviour of young 
people is taking place. Since 1995, fertility in Russia has been aging. The contribution 
of mothers at less than 25 years of age to the TFR is diminishing, while that of more 
mature mothers is increasing (Appendix, Table 11). Today, the mean age of mothers at 
first, second, and third births is higher than twenty years ago, and is close to that of the 
female cohorts born in the 1940s. The mean age at first marriage is increasing as well. 
The minimum mean age observed, in 1992–1993, was 23.9 for men and 21.7 for 
women. In 2004, as my estimate suggests, this indicator has increased to 26.1 for men 
and to 23.3 for women (Appendix, Table 17).  
The notable reduction of fertility at younger ages has not been accompanied, for 
the first time ever in Russian history, by an increase in induced abortion rates. On the 
contrary, abortion rates have halved over ten years, and the issue of registration of legal 
abortions has had little to do with this (Philipov et al. 2004) (Figure 10, Appendix, 
Table 21).   Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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Figure 12:  Abortion Rate (per 1,000 women 15–49) and Abortion Ratio  




























































per 1000 women aged 15-49 per 100 live births
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on official data. 
 
 
It is important to note that the sociological studies of which we are aware show 
that sexual activity among post-Soviet youth has increased, while the average age of 
sexual debut has become younger, and, at present, barely differs from that observed in 
the West (Denissenko et al. 1999, Golod 2005). At the same time, there is a shift 
towards the use of more effective contraceptive methods, which provides grounds for 
the widespread delay of the first birth and of union formation (Table 5). 
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Table 5:  Usage of contraceptive methods in Russia: selected survey data,  
  percentage of women in reproductive ages using contraception  
 




























































1.  c. of Moscow   1982 14 30 17 21 11 4 4 
2.  Khaborovsky kray, rural*   circa 1985 20.0 17.1 16.4 20.4 12.5 3.7 10.4 
   Tverskaya oblast, urban *    19.2 19.9 14.3 20.5 15.4 3.3 8.1 
   Chelyabinskaya oblast, urban*    20.3 20.5 18.7 16.7 11.7 2.4 10.8 
3.  c. of S.-Petersburg, c. of Kaluga  1988 18.4 24.4 14.7 16.9 24.4 3.3 Na 
4. 
Ivanovo oblast (urban+rural), c. of  
Ekaterinburg, c. of Perm **  1996 7.0 16.4 Na 17.1 42.3 10.3 6.8 
 
Ivanovo oblast (urban+rural), c. of  
Ekaterinburg, c. of Perm **  1999 11.0 16.4 Na 21.9 34.2 11.0 5.5 
5. Russia  (RusGGS-2004)***  2004 7.6 11.4 4.2 27.9 28.6 17.2 3.1 
 
Source: (1) Popov et al. 1993; (2) Shneiderman 1991; (3) Kharkova 1994; (4) Goldberg et al. 1998, Goldberg and Serbanescu 2001; 
(5) Zakharov and Sakevich 2006. 
Note: * Used contraception in the last two years; ** women having a partner; *** women having a partner, if a respondent reported 
several methods for this tabulation, the most effective method was chosen.  
(1) 75% of women used any method at the time of survey; (2) in last two years before the survey, regularly used any method: 64% of 
women in Tverskaya oblast, 60% in Chelyabinsk oblast, and 57% in Khabarovsk kray. 14%, 15%, and 20% of women in 
corresponding regions never used contraception; (3) 59% of women at risk of pregnancy used any method at the moment of 
survey; (4) 71.9% of women used any method at the moment of survey in 1996, and 72.8% in 1999; (5) 83.8% used any method 




5. Conceptions of ideal and desired family size and differential 
fertility in contemporary Russia 
5.1 Ideal, desired, and actual family size  
Nationally representative research carried out after 1990 shows that the conception of 
ideal and desired family size in Russia has not undergone significant change. After the 
shock resulting from the initial stages of the socio-political and economic reforms, the 
average evaluation of preferable family size was re-established (Figure 13). In public 
opinion, the two-child family continues to dominate as the social norm and desired 
model for one’s own family. The proportion of voluntary childlessness as a desired 
behavioural model does not have a distinguishable dynamic, varying at a low percent 
and, in general, not exceeding 5% in the data of differing studies.   
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Figure 13:  Mean ideal and mean desired number of children in a family.  Russia,  
women aged 16 and older, nationally representative surveys of 




































"Ideal" number of children
"Desired" number of children
 
Source: Surveys conducted by the Russian Centre for Public Opinion and Market Research (VCIOM). Bodrova V. (2002).  
Note: "Ideal" number of children based on responses to question: "If one speaks of the 'ideal family’ then how many children do you 
think are in it?" Desired" number of children based on responses to question: "How many children in all, including those you 
already have, would you want to have, if you had all that is necessary for this situation?" 
 
 
According to the latest representative survey (October 2006), the mean desired 
number of children per woman 18–34 years of age was 2.04 (58% would like to have 
two, one 21%, three or more 20%) (Arkhangelsky 2006).  We may compare this data 
with the results of the survey carried out in the framework of the Population 
Microcensus of 1994, which took place under the evident influence of the social shock 
called forth by disappointment with the reforms:  the mean desired number of children 
per woman 18–29 years of age was 1.78 (two children -- 52%, one -- 30%, three or 
more 13 %, none -- 5%) (Borisov 1997). 
Thus we do not have any confirmation that Russian women's preferences have 
shifted in the direction of dominance of one child and childlessness. 
We now examine the degree to which preferences are being realised in practice. 
Table 6 presents the mean of the potentially desired and concretely intended total 
number of children for women 21–35 years of age according to the data of the 1994 Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Microcensus, which is compared with the estimate of the actual mean number of births 
for this same cohort, i.e. eight years later. In addition to data for Russia as a whole, the 
table also gives an estimate for two regions which represent two poles with respect to 
models of marital and family relations and fertility: a) the more traditional Dagestan, 
which has not completed the first demographic transition (a multi-ethnic republic in the 
Northern Caucasus, population 2.6 million, primarily of Muslim faith and with a very 
low proportion -- less than 5% -- Slavic); b) the capital city of Moscow, competing with 
St. Petersburg for the rank of territory with the lowest fertility and a population of 10.4 
million, of which Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians comprise almost 88%.  
The first conclusion: the Russian population plans its fertility fairly well, in as 
much as the actual number of births does not strongly diverge from the expected 
number, according to the survey of eight years before. Muscovites achieve their goals 
the most consistently.  But even in Dagestan, where effective family planning is notably 
much worse (modern contraceptive methods are less widespread, the attitude towards 
abortion less liberal), the overwhelming majority of families have the number of 
children they anticipated at the start of their reproductive cycle. And, moreover, the 
fulfilment of plans made in these or other socio-economic conditions is not a strict 
adherence to an unchanging programme.   
The second conclusion is that the mass expectations of the population, formed in 
the very difficult economic conditions and low social expectations at the start of the 
1990s deflated into pessimism. This is confirmed by the actual total fertility for the 
generation of women born in the second half of the 1960s, who turn out to have by the 
middle of the first decade of the 21
st century not much more, but nonetheless more, than 
the mean expected number of children in the survey carried out a decade earlier.   
The third conclusion concerns the divergence of the actual number of children 
born from the mean desired number of children, at about the level of 0.1–0.3 children 
per woman.  Many experts see in this a reserve for increasing fertility which can be 
achieved in the event of well-constructed policies aimed at this. On the other hand, 
people as a rule wish to have more of any given good thing than in fact they have and, 
in contemporary conditions, this turns out to involve not only material goods but also 
children. Therefore, it is hardly possible to set as an achievable goal the satisfaction of 
all desires.  It is more important to create an atmosphere in society against the lowering 
of the social norm itself concerning the mean number of children in families, or some 
sort of "ideal image" of the two-child family, which is closely connected with the wish 
of an individual to have a defined number of children in their own family, and to which 
in turn actual fertility is drawn, although with significantly more elasticity. 
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Table 6:  ‘Desired’ and ‘Expected’ mean number of children in a family of  
respondent (1994 Microcensus), and mean number of children 
actually born (2002 Census), female birth cohorts  
 
1994 Microcensus  2002 Census 




















1958–1962 31–35  1.99 1.85  40–44  1.83  –0.14  –0.16 
1963–1967 26–30  1.87 1.66  35–39  1.73  –0.21  –0.14 
1968–1972 21–25  1.74 1.47  30–34  1.62  –0.27  –0.12 
City of Moscow 
1958–1962 31–35  1.74 1.52  40–44  1.48  –0.22  –0.26 
1963–1967 26–30  1.68 1.42  35–39  1.42  –0.26  –0.26 
1968–1972 21–25  1.62 1.34  30–34  1.38  –0.28  –0.24 
Dagestan Republic 
1958–1962 31–35  3.08 2.93  40–44  2.81  –0.15  –0.27 
1963–1967 26–30  2.74 2.58  35–39  2.63  –0.16  –0.11 
1968–1972 21–25  2.61 2.40  30–34  2.42  –0.21  –0.19 
 
Source: Marital status and fertility in Russia (according to the data of the 1994 Microcensus of the Population).   Goskomstat of 
Russia. Moscow, 1995; Fertility. Results of the All-Russia 2002 Census of the Population.  Volume 12, Rosstat. Moscow, 2005; 
Author’s calculations 
Note: * ‘Expected’ number based on responses to question “How many children do you intend to have (including already present)?”  
** ‘Desired’ number based on responses to question “What is your desired number of children?” 
***To the actual number of children born by the 2002 Census is added the expected number of children, in accordance with current 
fertility statistics for 2002–2004. 
 
 
Representatives of different social groups react in different ways to changes in 
social and economic realities. In Russia, as, by the way, in other countries, there are 
four basic factors differentiating fertility: marital or partnership status; geographical 
location (cities of different types, rural settlements); ethnic membership; and, 
educational status. The complex combination of these factors, expressed in population 
structures, is reflected in the regional and territorial variety of fertility Russia. 
 
 
5.2 Regional variety in fertility  
An overall representation of the changes in regional variations in Russia in the last 15 
years is given in Figure 14. A rapid reduction in fertility in the first five years of the 
1990s was accompanied by a temporary increase in regional variation. Following this, Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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however, a tendency towards unification in fertility level predominated, and, currently, 
regional variety is lower than it was at the start of political and economic reforms. 
In this way, the historical tendency toward reduction in interregional variation in 
fertility and regimes of population reproduction have been restored. (See Zakharov, 
1994, Zakharov and Ivanova 1996). It is consequently possible to hypothesize that 
differential fertility, based on social indicators, will more likely decline rather than 
increase. 
 











































Source: Author’s calculations based on the Demographic Yearbook of Russia. Goskomstat/Rosstat. Moscow, corresponding years. 
Note: Mean TFR is unweighted arithmetic mean for 79 administrative units of the Russian Federation; Coefficient of variation is 
ratio of standard deviation to arithmetic mean (%). 
 
 
5.3 Differentials by marital status  
Being married is a significant advantage in terms of the number of children born.  At 
the same time, significant changes in marital behaviour have occurred in the last 
decade, and namely that the proportion of women aged 18–34 who are married declined 
from 62% to 45% (Table 7). Although the child-bearing preferences among unmarried 
women rose, this was insufficient to compensate for the effect stemming from the Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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change in marital status.  As a result, the low overall fertility in Russia nowadays can be 
largely explained by the population’s sceptical attitude towards the advantages afforded 
by legal marriage.  At the same time, informal partnership unions, which are rapidly 
becoming widespread, are still not seen by the majority of the population as an equally 
significant alternative to marriage in relationship to child-bearing. 
 
Table 7:  Period TFR for women in and out of legal marriage, and proportion  
  of legally married and unmarried women aged 15–49 and 18–34.  
  Russia, 1993–1994 and 2003–2004  
 








TFR 1.38  2.41  0.26 
Distribution by marital status (percent) 
15–49  100.0 61.1  39.9 
18–34  100.0 61.5  39.5 
2002–2003 
TFR 1.29  2.01  0.36 
Distribution by marital status (percent) 
15–49  100.0 50.2  49.8 
18–34  100.0 44.9  54.1 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on unpublished data of the 1994 Microcensus, of the 2002 Census, and birth statistics by marital 
status of women by single age group for corresponding years. 
Note: Life-time TFR adjusted by expected duration in a specified uninterrupted marital status according to then-current marital 
structure by age (Microcensus 1994: expected duration of registered marriage by age of 50 was 21.2 years, and duration of 
being out of registered marriage, including never married, separated and widowed, was 13.8 years; Census 2002: 17.8 years 
and 17.2 years correspondingly).  
 
 
5.4 Urban-rural differentials  
Urban-rural differentials in fertility level remain highly significant at present. At the 
same time, these differentials over two decades have been strongly reduced as a result 
of the rapid rate of reduction in fertility in rural areas (Table 8). The contribution of 
rural residents to births in the country in the period 2002–2005 was less than 29% -- the 
lowest level in the history of Russia. (At the start of the 1960s, rural residents provided 
more than half of the births in the country and at the start of the 1990s, 31–32%). We 
note that the urban and rural proportions in the total population of the country in the last 
ten to twenty years have changed little. Therefore, the reduction in overall fertility in Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Russia is to a substantial extent explained by the rapid change in reproductive 
behaviour of rural inhabitants, reducing their fertility in the direction of a lower birth 
rate than that of urban residents. 
 
Table 8:  Period and Cohort total fertility rates for urban and rural  
  population, and proportion of urban and rural population.  











in Rural and 
Urban 
populations 
Per cent of 
urban 
population 
Per cent of 
rural 
population 
Year  Period total fertility rate 
1979–1980  1.89 1.70 2.50  0.80  69.8  30.2 
1994  1.39 1.24 1.91  0.67  73.0  27.0 
2004  1.34 1.25 1.67  0.42  73.2  26.8 
Birth cohort  Cohort completed fertility, 2002 Census 
1948–1952  1.85 1.70 2.37  0.67  78.2  21.9 
1953–1957  1.88 1.73 2.35  0.62  76.8  23.2 
1958–1962  1.83 1.69 2.26  0.57  75.6  24.4 
1963–1967*  1.73 1.59 2.14  0.55  74.8  25.2 
 
Source: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia. Rosstat. Moscow, 2000, 2006; Fertility. Results of the All-Russian 2002 Census of 
the Population.  Volume 12, Rosstat. Moscow, 2005; Author’s calculations. 
 
 
5.5 Inter-ethnic differentiation  
At first glance, the ethnic factor in Russian fertility appears important, in as much as the 
differentials between ethnic groups is boldly delimited. Among 16 ethnic groups, 
comprising 95% of Russia’s population, there are those which have not yet completed 
the first demographic transition (peoples of the Caucasus, represented in Table 9, and 
also the less numerous peoples of Siberia and the Far East which are not in the table.)  
With rare exceptions, (Azeris, Kazakhs) peoples with higher fertility have lived in their 
own local areas from ancient times, that is, they are not migrants.  At the same time, the 
contribution of ethnic minorities with a higher fertility to the overall fertility level in the 
country is minimal as a result of their small representation within Russia’s population. 
There is little chance that these populations will materially increase their contribution to 
Russian fertility in the future, in as much as ethnic differentials in fertility are quickly 
converging because of a rapid reduction in fertility among precisely those peoples for 
whom it is now relatively high. In fact, this means that the ethnic factor is presently 
acting in the direction of a reduction and not an increase in fertility. On the other hand, Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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it is impossible to rule out in the not so distant future an increase in ethnic and 
demographic variety in Russia, as a result of a strengthened migration from Central 
Asia and other regions with a higher fertility. 
 
Table 9:  Completed cohort fertility by major ethnic groups residing in Russia;  
proportion of ethnic group in total population of Russia,  
and in female population aged 20–49; contribution of women by 
ethnicity to total number of births. Russia, 2002 Census  
 
Mean number of children ever 

























women of  
specified 
ethnicity to 












Russian 1.77  1.81  1.76  1.33 80.6 80.0  76.8 
Tatar 2.01  1.97  1.89  1.48  3.9  4.0 4.4 
Ukrainian 1.91  1.90  1.85  1.54  2.0  2.1  2.4 
Bashkir 2.43  2.31  2.13  1.66 1.2  1.2  1.5 
Chuvash 2.26  2.19  2.05  1.62  1.1  1.2  1.4 
Chechen 3.86  3.47  3.13  2.18  0.9  0.2  0.3 
Armenian 2.16  2.14  2.14 1.68  0.8  0.7  0.9 
Mordvinian 2.07  1.97  1.89  1.59  0.6  0.6  0.7 
Avar 3.61  3.23  2.90  1.97  0.6  0.5  0.8 
Belarusian 1.87  1.88  1.79  1.55  0.6  0.6  0.6 
Kazakh 2.90  2.55  2.23  1.69 0.5  0.5  0.6 
Udmurt 2.27  2.18  2.09  1.69 0.4  0.5  0.6 
Azeri 2.85  2.60  2.44  1.91  0.4  0.4 0.5 
Mari 2.44  2.34  2.18  1.72  0.4  0.5  0.6 
German 2.21  2.23  2.19  1.61  0.4  0.4  0.5 
Kabardinian 2.62 2.49  2.37  1.67  0.4  0.4  0.5 
Russia 1.85  1.88  1.83  1.39  94.8**  93.9**  93.0** 
 
Source: Fertility. Results of the All-Russian 2002 Census of the Population. Volume 12, Rosstat. Moscow, 2005; National 
composition and language, citizenship. Results of the All-Russian 2002 Census of the Population, Vol. 4(1). Rosstat. Moscow, 
2004. 
Note: Ethnic groups with contribution of 0.5% and more to the total number of births by women aged 20–49 by the date of the 2002 
Census. ** Total for listed ethnic groups in Russia’s population of specified category (sums by column). 
 
 
5.6 Differentials by level of education  
Differentials in level of education are probably the only example of a social differential 
in Russian fertility which have not only failed to decrease in the last decade, but have Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
946   http://www.demographic-research.org 
instead increased.  Among the female cohorts born in the second half of the 1960s, 
those with a higher education had an average of 0.25 children less than those with a 
secondary technical (general professional) education. The latter, in turn, had 0.22 
children less than those with a full secondary education, while for the cohorts born in 
the first half of the 1950s, these differentials were about 0.22 and 0.15, respectively 
(Table 10). The restructuring of the Russian population in the direction of a higher 
educational status is monotonic, and this long-term tendency undoubtedly plays an 
important role in maintaining Russian fertility at a very low level, facilitating its further 
reduction. 
 
Table 10:  Completed cohort fertility by education level, and proportion of  
women with specified level of education in birth cohorts.  
Russia, 2002 Census  
 










lower (9 and 
less years) 
Cohort completed fertility, 2000 Census 
1948–1952  1.85 1.57 1.78  1.91  2.40 
1953–1957  1.88 1.60 1.83  1.99  2.45 
1958–1962  1.83 1.56 1.80  2.00  2.33 
1963–1967*  1.73 1.47 1.72  1.94  2.20 
Percentage of  women with a specified education 
1948–1952  97.5** 20.0 37.7  29.3  10.5 
1953–1957  97.5** 21.2 39.3  30.4  6.6 
1958–1962  97.0** 22.7 40.5  29.6  4.2 
1963–1967  96.5** 24.1 41.2  27.3  3.9 
 
Source: Fertility. Results of the All-Russian 2002 Census of the Population. Volume 12, Rosstat. Moscow, 2005. 
Note: *To the actual number of children born by the census of 2002 is added the expected number according to the current fertility 
statistics for 2002–2004. 
**The deviation from 100% is due to students in the final years of higher education and those who have interrupted their education 




Summarising the short examination of the dynamics of social structures and social 
differentials in fertility, it is not possible to conclude that over the last two decades they 
acted in their totality to reduce fertility in Russia. Less advanced social and ethnic 
groups of the population have been dynamically transforming the character of their 
fertility in the direction of vanguard reference social groups: urban residents of Russian 
ethnicity with low fertility. At the same time, women with higher educational levels and 
the lowest fertility not only increased their proportion in the Russian population, but 
also decreased their fertility the most rapidly. As a result, the gap has increased between Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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the desired number of children in a family, maintained in surveys of public opinion at 
the same level, and the actual level of fertility. The maximum dissatisfaction with the 
number of children in their families, according to the data of RusGGS-2004 is 
expressed by urban females with a higher education (Maleva and Sinyavskaya 2006). 
 
 
6. Principal conclusions  
1. There is no doubt that the fertility of the cohorts born in the 1970s and 1980s will be 
lower than that of those of the 1960s.  In this regard, Russia does not stand out against 
the background of developed nations.  
 
2. The ageing of fertility in Russia is proceeding at a slower pace, in comparison with 
other countries, and even with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Whether 
this should be considered an advantage or not is a question for the future. The 
“younger” model of family today gives more room for manoeuvre tomorrow. Partners 
beginning childbearing at relatively early ages have a greater temporal distance (time) 
for the re-examination of plans with regard to second and third births than those starting 
at age 30, as has become popular in western countries. 
 
3. Based on the current values of PTFR (1.35 in 2004), we can expect to lose about 0.5 
children per woman for the cohorts born in 1980–1981, as compared to the cohort of 
1960–1961 which is reaching post-childbearing ages with 1.81 children per woman.  
On the other hand, there is some evidence to suggest that this reduction may be less 
significant. First, in the last four years, fertility in Russia has been increasing, primarily 
at ages over 25. Second, as is well known, PTFR values are underestimated because of 
changes in timing as fertility ages. The Bongaarts-Feeney adjustment gives a better 
estimate of the fertility level, at 1.5 (Partnership 2003) (Appendix, Table 19), provided 
that the compensating rise of fertility at older ages will be at the same level as we have 
now. However, this estimate also seems too pessimistic. The mean order of birth 
(weighted with order-specific PTFR), although it fell from 1.8 in the 1980s to 1.6 at the 
beginning of the 1990s, has remained the same over the last twelve years (Fig.15, 
Appendix, Table 19). Since childlessness in Russia is low and does not currently 
display an evident tendency to increase, we would propose that this may well be the 
best estimate of completed fertility of the cohorts which are now of childbearing age. If 
we extrapolate the age-specific rates and apply the tempo of changes recorded in the 
period 1999–2004 to obtain the estimates for generations, we would also get the same 
result: 1.6 children per woman may be expected for the cohorts born in 1980–1981 
(Table 11). It is interesting to note that in one of the variants of the “Conception of Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Demographic Policy to 2015/2025”, developed by the Ministry of Health and Social 
Development of Russia and available to demographic experts, it says that as a result of 
the initiation of measures to stimulate fertility, an increase in the TFR to the level of 
1.6–1.7 is expected by 2015. As was shown above, these figures may be taken to be 
fully probable and well-founded.  Moreover, they reflect the agreed opinion of Russian 
specialists with differing ideological positions. The question impossible to answer now 
is this: What will be the role of timing and quantum effects under the influence of 
policy? The stabilization of cohort completed fertility at the level of 1.6 children is 
completely realistic but it is not known if it is possible to rely on an increase in fertility 
higher than this value. 
 
4. If the transformation of the age pattern of fertility continues at the present pace, there 
is virtually no chance for Russia, within the next 10–15 years, to arrive at the age 
profile of fertility observed in Western countries. For the generation of women born in 
1980–1981, our projection for the mean age at childbearing is about 27.1, which is 2 
years higher than in the generation of 1960–1961. However, even this value is still 
behind the levels which are characteristic of the cohorts born in Western countries in 
the middle of the 1960s (28 years). 
 
5. Estimating the proportion of childless women for the birth cohorts of the 1980s is 
scarcely reliable, since major changes are now taking place in the timing of fertility. 
Nevertheless, it should not exceed 15% in the generation of the 1980s, but more likely 
will be a lower proportion. For the generations born in the 1970s it can be estimated as 
a maximum of 10%. 
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The number of 
children 
actually born by 
2005, per 
woman
Completed fertility based on 
the age-specific rates 
observed in 2004 
Completed fertility based on 
trends in change of age-specific 
rates observed in 1999–2004. 














1960–1961  43 1.82  1.82  -  1.82  - 
1965–1966  38 1.63  1.66  –0.16  1.66  –0.16 
1970–1971  33 1.41  1.55  –0.27  1.58  –0.23 
1975–1976  28 1.05  1.45  –0.37  1.54  –0.27 
1980–1981  23 0.54  1.37  –0.45  1.60  –0.21 
 
Source: Author’s estimates  
 
 
Figure 15:  Conventional PTFR, PTFR adjusted by Bongaarts-Feeney method,  




































Source: Author’s calculations. 
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Many neo-traditional features of fertility and nuptiality remain in today’s Russia, if 
one compares the present situation not with the previous Soviet period but with the 
contemporary situation in Western countries: early marriage and relatively young age at 
birth of the first child; low prevalence of deliberate childlessness; and, a fast pace in 
achieving the ultimate family size. The traditional goal among women is still that of the 
role as mother, and this still prevails over career and educational self-realisation. 
Although these features, which distinguish Russia from developed nations, are still 
undergoing change, they will persist into the next one to two decades. At the same time, 
the completed fertility of actual and hypothetical cohorts differs very little from the 
average European level. 
Many observers believe that the situation concerning Russian fertility is just a 
reflection of severe socio-economic conditions (low income, inefficient social policy 
etc.). In my view, however, this is a simplification, and moreover is not very useful for 
the goals of demographic forecasting. 
Profound changes are taking place in the reproductive behaviour of Russians. New 
attitudes and perceptions, which we do not yet know well, towards family, marriage, 
partnership, age of beginning and completing childbearing, and family planning are 
emerging as a mass phenomenon. However, what we now know allows us to believe 
that the fertility pattern in Russia is most likely undergoing a major transformation 
which lies within the main course of fertility evolution in the developed countries and 
which is named the Second Demographic Transition. If this assumption is correct, 
Russia would scarcely be expected to return to the past timing model of fertility, 
characteristic of the 1970s and 1980s, and, in contrast to the divergence we had in the 
1970s and 1980s, the convergence of Russia towards the Western countries, though 
lagging behind, will become the future of Russian fertility. 
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APPENDIX  
Table A1:  Completed cohort and period total fertility in Russia  
  (female birth cohorts 1841–1970, calendar years 1896–2005)  
 
Birth cohorts  Cohort completed fertility  Calendar years *  Period total fertility 
1841–1845  6.84      
1846–1850 6.90      
1851–1855 7.08      
1856–1860 7.11      
1861–1865 7.12      
1866–1870 7.20    1896–1900 7.30 
1871–1875 6.96    1901–1905 7.12 
1876–1880 6.85    1906–1910 7.17 
1881–1885 6.20    1911–1915 6.30 
1886–1890 5.49    1916–1920 5.23 
1891–1895 5.50    1921–1925 6.16 
1896–1900 5.23    1926–1930 6.38 
1901–1905 4.59    1931–1935 4.51 
1906–1910 3.66    1936–1940 4.74 
1911–1915 2.82    1941–1945 2.60 
1916–1920 2.46    1946–1950 2.89 
1921–1925 2.25    1951–1955 2.86 
1926–1930 2.20    1956–1960 2.67 
1931–1935 2.15    1961–1965 2.33 
1936–1940 2.01    1966–1970 2.03 
1941–1945 1.91    1971–1975 2.01 
1946–1950 1.85    1976–1980 1.93 
1951–1955 1.89    1981–1985 2.02 
1956–1960 1.87    1986–1990 2.08 
1961–1965 1.73  **  1991–1995 1.48 
1966–1970 1.60  **  1996–2000 1.22 
1971–1975 1.52  **  2001–2005 1.30 
 
Source: Zakharov 2006a (updated). 
Note: *Calendar years are the years when the generations indicated in the left part of the table reach the age of 30.  
** Preliminary estimate. Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Table A2:  Distribution of women by number of children ever born  
  by age 50 (in %) and the average number of children (per woman),  
  Russia, female birth cohorts 1868–1968  
 
Birth 




  0  1 2 3 4 5 6  7+     
Before 1874  5.0 2.5 2.9 4.8 6.5 8.2 9.3 60.8 100.0 7.11 
1874–1878 5.3 3.1 3.2 5.9 7.3 10.2 10.1 54.9 100.0 6.79 
1879–1883 5.5 3.8 5.0 7.1 8.1 11.6 10.5 48.4 100.0 6.39 
1884–1888 6.0 4.4 6.3 8.1 9.1 12.1 10.6 43.4 100.0 6.05 
1889–1893 6.5 5.5 8.7 9.8 10.0 12.3 10.7 36.5 100.0 5.57 
1894–1898 6.8 6.5 9.3 10.0 11.1 12.1 10.3 33.9 100.0 5.37 
1899–1903 7.7 8.0 11.6 12.2 12.3 11.2 9.5 27.5 100.0 4.86 
1904–1908 9.4 11.5 15.0 15.0 12.6 10.5 8.2 17.8 100.0 4.04 
1909–1913 11.3 17.3 21.4 17.1 11.4 8.1 4.8 8.6 100.0 3.06 
1914–1918 12.5 21.0 24.2 16.5 9.7 6.3 3.7 6.1 100.0 2.68 
1919–1923 14.1 23.7 27.3 15.5 8.0 4.9 2.6 3.9 100.0 2.33 
1924–1928 11.8 22.5 32.4 16.4 7.4 4.3 2.1 3.1 100.0 2.28 
1929–1933 9.5 23.2 37.5 15.8 6.2 3.6 1.7 2.5 100.0 2.21 
1934–1938 8.0 26.0 42.1 13.8 4.4 2.7 1.2 1.8 100.0 2.07 
1939–1943 7.9 27.3 43.4 12.9 3.7 2.3 1.0 1.5 100.0 1.99 
1944–1948 8.1 29.9 45.1 11.0 2.7 1.5 0.6 1.1 100.0 1.85 
1949–1953 7.1 27.7 47.9 12.3 2.6 1.4 0.5 0.5 100.0 1.86 
1954–1958* 6.7 26.5 48.6 13.5 2.6 1.3 0.4 0.4 100.0 1.88 
1959–1963* 7.5 29.0 49.3 10.5 2.1 1.2 0.2 0.2 100.0 1.77 
1964–1968* 8.5 37.0 43.8 8.0 1.5 1.0 0.1 0.2 100.0 1.61 
 
Source: Zakharov 2006b. 
Note: *Preliminary estimate. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
http://www.demographic-research.org 957 
Table A3:  Final parity progression ratios for women by age 50, Russia,  
  female birth cohorts 1868–1968 (per 100)  
 
Births cohorts  0 –> 1  1 –> 2  2 –> 3  3 –> 4  4 –> 5  5 –> 6  6 –> 7 
Before  1874  95.0  97.4 96.9 94.6 92.3 89.5 86.7 
1874–1878  94.7  96.7 96.5 93.3 91.2 86.4 84.5 
1879–1883  94.5  96.0 94.5 91.7 89.7 83.5 82.2 
1884–1888  94.0  95.3 93.0 90.3 87.9 81.7 80.4 
1889–1893  93.5  94.1 90.1 87.6 85.6 79.3 77.3 
1894–1898  93.2  93.0 89.3 87.1 83.5 78.5 76.7 
1899–1903  92.3  91.3 86.2 83.2 79.7 76.8 74.3 
1904–1908  90.6  87.3 81.0 76.6 74.3 71.2 68.5 
1909–1913  88.7  80.4 70.0 65.8 65.3 62.3 64.2 
1914–1918  87.5  76.0 63.6 61.0 62.4 60.9 62.2 
1919–1923  85.9  72.4 56.1 55.6 58.8 57.0 60.0 
1924–1928  88.2  74.4 50.6 50.6 55.9 54.3 58.8 
1929–1933  90.4  74.3 44.2 46.8 55.4 53.2 58.5 
1934–1938  92.1  71.8 36.2 42.3 56.4 52.6 59.9 
1939–1943  92.1  70.4 33.0 39.7 56.5 52.1 60.1 
1944–1948  91.9  67.5 27.3 34.3 53.4 50.6 62.5 
1949–1953  92.9  70.2 26.5 28.9 48.0 41.7 59.8 
1954–1958*  93.3  71.6 27.2 25.8 46.8 40.9 58.3 
1959–1963*  92.5  68.6 22.4 26.1 43.2 37.5 51.5 
1964–1968*  91.5  59.6 19.6 25.2 43.1 36.7 50.0 
 
Source: Zakharov 2006b. 
Note: *Preliminary estimate. Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Table A4:  Distribution of women at first continuous marriage by ever born  
children (in %) and the average number of children (per woman): 




of birth*  Number of children  Total 
Average number of 
children 
   0 1 2 3  4+     
1920–1924  1900–1904 4.7 6.1 6.7  14.9  67.7  100.0  4.70 
1925–1929  1905–1909 5.4 6.6  14.2  17.8  56.0  100.0  4.24 
1930–1934  1910–1914 5.3 9.4  20.8  18.2  46.3  100.0  3.74 
1935–1939  1915–1919  5.3 14.0 25.4 19.4 35.8  100.0  3.38 
1940–1944  1920–1924  5.3 15.5 30.2 20.5 28.5  100.0  3.08 
1945–1949  1925–1929  5.3 15.4 35.2 21.6 22.5  100.0  2.68 
1950–1954  1930–1934  4.8 18.2 42.2 19.2 15.6  100.0  2.41 
1955–1959  1935–1939  4.1 20.4 46.9 17.0 11.6  100.0  2.26 
1960–1964  1940–1944  4.3 24.9 50.4 13.0  7.4  100.0  2.03 
1965–1969  1945–1949  4.0 25.8 52.4 12.0  5.8  100.0  1.97 
1970–1974  1950–1954  3.3 23.9 54.5 13.2  5.1  100.0  1.99 
1975–1979  1955–1959  3.4 20.9 56.9 14.1  4.7  100.0  2.01 
1980–1984**  1960–1964  4.4 26.3 55.6 10.8  2.9  100.0  1.85 
 
Source: Zakharov 2006b. 
Note: * Based on the assumption that the average age at first marriage is 20. 
** Preliminary estimate by the 10th year of first continuous marriage. One may expect that completed fertility for this marriage cohort 
would be 1.9. The proportion of infertile women will most likely remain the same, and the proportion of women with two children 
will slightly grow to 56–57%. 
 
 
Table A5:  Parity progression ratios for women at first continuous marriage,  
  Russia: female marriage cohorts 1920–1984 (per 100)  
Marriage cohorts  Possible years of birth*  0 –> 1  1 –> 2  2 –> 3  3 –> 4 
1920–1924 1900–1904  95.3  93.6  92.5  87.7 
1925–1929 1905–1909  94.6  92.1  83.9  79.7 
1930–1934 1910–1914  94.4  89.2  75.6  71.7 
1935–1939 1915–1919  94.5  85.2  68.5  64.8 
1940–1944 1920–1924  94.6  83.6  61.9  58.3 
1945–1949 1925–1929  94.7  83.7  55.6  51.0 
1950–1954 1930–1934  95.2  80.9  45.2  44.8 
1950–1959 1935–1939  95.9  78.7  37.9  40.6 
1960–1964 1940–1944  95.7  74.0  28.8  36.3 
1965–1969 1945–1949  96.0  73.1  25.4  32.6 
1970–1974 1950–1954  96.7  75.3  25.1  27.9 
1975–1979 1955–1959  96.6  78.4  24.8  25.0 
1980–1984** 1960–1964  95.6  72.4  19.8  21.2 
 
Source: Zakharov 2006b. 
Note: * Based on the assumption that the average age at first marriage is 20. 
** The preliminary estimate by the 10th year of marriage. It is expected that by the 20th year of marriage, PPR0 will not change, 
PPR1 will increase to 73–75, and PPR3 and PPR4 will also grow to 22–24. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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Table A6:  The average number of children born alive and those who survive to  
  ages 1, 10, 15 and 20: Russia, female birth cohorts 1841–1970  
 
Birth cohorts  Born alive  Out of them survive to age: 
    1  10 15 20 
1841–1845  6.84  4.52 3.19 3.09 2.99 
1846–1850  6.90  4.57 3.23 3.13 3.02 
1851–1855  7.08  4.71 3.33 3.23 3.11 
1856–1860  7.11  4.76 3.39 3.29 3.13 
1861–1865  7.12  4.81 3.47 3.35 3.17 
1866–1870  7.20  4.93 3.59 3.47 3.26 
1871–1875  6.96  4.86 3.56 3.42 3.22 
1876–1880  6.85  4.88 3.58 3.45 3.23 
1881–1885  6.20  4.48 3.30 3.18 2.97 
1886–1890  5.49  4.01 2.96 2.87 2.68 
1891–1895  5.50  4.03 3.01 2.93 2.72 
1896–1900  5.23  3.83 2.92 2.85 2.65 
1901–1905  4.59  3.37 2.63 2.58 2.44 
1906–1910  3.66  2.71 2.16 2.13 2.08 
1911–1915  2.82  2.16 1.79 1.77 1.76 
1916–1920  2.46  2.01 1.77 1.76 1.75 
1921–1925  2.25  1.99 1.88 1.87 1.86 
1926–1930  2.20  2.03 1.97 1.97 1.95 
1931–1935  2.15  2.04 2.01 2.00 1.99 
1936–1940  2.01  1.95 1.92 1.92 1.91 
1941–1945  1.91  1.85 1.84 1.83 1.82 
1946–1950  1.85  1.80 1.78 1.78 1.77 
1951–1955  1.89  1.84 1.83 1.82 1.81 
1956–1960  1.87  1.82 1.81 1.80 1.79 
1961–1965*  1.71  1.68 1.66 1.66 1.65 
1966–1970*  1.56  1.53 1.52 1.52 1.50 
 
Source: Zakharov 2003 (updated). 
Note: * Preliminary estimate. Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Table A7:  The distribution of women by number of live born daughters  
reaching age 28 (in %) and the average number of daughters reaching 




daughters 1 2 3 4 5 6  7+  Total 
Average number 
of daughters 
Before 1874  25.1 29.4 24.7 13.9 5.3 1.3 0.2 0.0 100.0 1.50 
1874–1878 25.6 29.3 24.2 13.7 5.4 1.5 0.2 0.0 100.0 1.49 
1879–1883 27.6 29.8 23.2 12.8 5.0 1.4 0.2 0.0 100.0 1.43 
1884–1888 29.1 29.9 22.4 12.2 4.8 1.3 0.2 0.0 100.0 1.39 
1889–1893 31.5 30.2 21.2 11.2 4.4 1.2 0.2 0.0 100.0 1.32 
1894–1898 32.0 30.1 20.8 11.1 4.5 1.3 0.2 0.0 100.0 1.31 
1899–1903 34.0 30.2 19.6 10.2 4.3 1.3 0.3 0.0 100.0 1.26 
1904–1908 38.6 30.9 17.5 8.3 3.4 1.1 0.2 0.0 100.0 1.11 
1909–1913 44.8 32.1 14.6 5.6 2.1 0.7 0.1 0.0 100.0 0.91 
1914–1918 45.2 32.7 14.1 5.2 2.0 0.7 0.2 0.0 100.0 0.89 
1919–1923 44.1 33.9 14.4 4.9 1.8 0.6 0.2 0.0 100.0 0.89 
1924–1928 39.7 36.3 16.3 5.1 1.8 0.6 0.1 0.0 100.0 0.96 
1929–1933 37.4 38.4 17.1 4.8 1.6 0.5 0.1 0.0 100.0 0.97 
1934–1938 36.8 40.6 16.9 3.9 1.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 100.0 0.94 
1939–1943 37.2 41.2 16.6 3.5 1.1 0.4 0.1 0.0 100.0 0.92 
1944–1948 38.7 42.1 15.6 2.6 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 100.0 0.86 
1949–1953 37.4 42.8 16.5 2.5 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.87 
1954–1958* 36.7 43.0 17.0 2.6 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.88 
1959–1963* 38.4 43.2 15.9 2.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.83 
1964–1968* 41.5 43.1 13.5 1.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.76 
 
Source: Zakharov 2003 (updated). 
Note: *Preliminary estimate. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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Table A8:  Age-specific birth rates and completed cohort fertility, Russia: female  
  birth cohorts 1880–1969  
 
Birth cohorts  Live-born children per 1,000 women at age:  Completed fertility* 
  15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49   
1880–1884  55 217 257 267 245 164  67  6.4 
1885–1889  48 185 234 241 207 138  59  5.6 
1890–1894  48 186 218 274 216 114  44  5.5 
1895–1899  41 189 300 244 167  99  23  5.3 
1900–1904  30 219 298 177 166  49  9  4.7 
1905–1909  37 224 196 195  77  40  6  3.9 
1910–1914  36 151 211  86  72  28  2  2.9 
1915–1919  32 182  97 106  68  18  2  2.5 
1920–1924  31  85 162 108  54  13  1  2.3 
1925–1929  12.8 128.6 160.3  95.1  36.7  8.7  0.5  2.21 
1930–1934  21.2 140.4 150.9  80.5  32.4  7.3  0.4  2.17 
1935–1939  13.3 154.4 131.5  72.6  30.4  5.9  0.3  2.04 
1940–1944  28.9 157.5 112.8  62.5  20.7  4.2  0.2  1.93 
1945–1949  23.4 146.9 112.5  59.2  24.0  4.9  0.2  1.84 
1950–1954  27.6 157.8 105.4  61.4  22.4  2.5  0.1  1.89 
1955–1959  32.9 158.3 115.0  55.1  11.5  2.3**  0.1**  1.88** 
1960–1964  39.8 164.0 102.5  30.6  11.8**  2.3**  0.1**  1.76** 
1965–1969  45.0  158.0 66.4 39.5  13.6**  2.3**  0.2**  1.63** 
 
Source: Zakharov 2006c. 
Note: * Per woman. ** Preliminary estimate. Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Table A9:  Mean age of women at childbearing and contribution of age groups to  





Mean age at 
childbearing  Contribution of age group (in %):  Total 
   15–19  20–24  25–29  30–34  35–39  40–44  45–49   
1880–1884 32.2  4.3  17.1  20.2  21.0  19.3  12.9  5.2  100.0 
1885–1889 32.1  4.3  16.7  21.0  21.7  18.6  12.4  5.3  100.0 
1890–1894 31.8  4.4  17.0  19.8  24.9  19.6  10.3  4.0  100.0 
1895–1899 30.8  3.9  17.8  28.2  23.0  15.7  9.3  2.1  100.0 
1900–1904 29.7  3.2  23.1  31.4  18.7  17.5  5.2  0.9  100.0 
1905–1909  28.8  4.7  28.9 25.3  25.2 9.9  5.2  0.8  100.0 
1910–1914 28.3  6.2  25.8  36.0  14.6  12.3  4.8  0.3  100.0 
1915–1919 28.0  6.4  36.1  19.2  21.0  13.4  3.6  0.3  100.0 
1920–1924 28.7  6.7  18.8  35.7  23.7  12.1  2.8  0.2  100.0 
1925–1929  27.9  2.9  29.0 36.2  21.5 8.3  2.0  0.1  100.0 
1930–1934  27.3  4.9  32.4 34.8  18.6 7.5  1.7  0.1  100.0 
1935–1939  27.1  3.3  37.8 32.2  17.8 7.4  1.4  0.1  100.0 
1940–1944  26.2  7.5  40.6 29.1  16.2 5.4  1.1  0.1  100.0 
1945–1949  26.5  6.4  39.9 30.6  15.3 6.5  1.3  0.0  100.0 
1950–1954  26.2  7.3  41.8 28.0  16.3 5.9  0.7  0.0  100.0 
1955–1959*  25.7  8.8  42.2 30.6  14.7 3.1  0.6  0.0  100.0 
1960–1964*  24.9  11.4  46.8 29.2 8.7 3.3  0.6  0.0  100.0 
1965–1969*  24.6  14.2  49.7 20.9  10.5 3.9  0.7  0.1  100.0 
 
Source: Zakharov 2006c. 
Note: *Preliminary estimate. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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Table A10:  Age-specific birth rates and PTFR, Russia: 1895–2004  
 
Years  Live-born children per 1,000 women at age:  PTFR* 
  15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49   
1895–1899  48 262 355 359 234 158  67  7.4 
1900–1904  46 258 349 353 230 155  66  7.3 
1905–1909  44 226 340 344 224 151  65  7.0 
1910–1914  43 218 311 335 218 147  63  6.7 
1915–1919  31 175 223 238 145  98  42  4.8 
1920–1924  34 211 277 278 193 131  56  5.9 
1925–1929  38.6 237.5 312.3 306.8 215.2 141.0  65.3  6.58 
1930–1934  35.1 181.6 217.6 199.8 176.7  98.1  54.6  4.82 
1935–1939  36.0 191.9 230.9 186.0 164.8  98.3  41.2  4.75 
1940–1944  22.3 118.1 139.8 133.4 103.0  71.9  25.0  3.07 
1945–1949  18.6  131.0  144.7  104.8 84.5 42.5 12.2  2.69 
1950–1954 15.4  146.2  187.2  112.9  70.9  36.3  6.3  2.88 
1955–1959 23.6  147.0  164.8  118.6  65.1  22.1  3.0  2.72 
1960–1964  24.7  156.9  143.5 91.6 48.7 15.6  1.8  2.41 
1965–1969  25.2  147.0  115.5 75.7 35.8 11.7  1.3  2.06 
1970–1974 30.6  153.2  112.1  65.2  32.2  8.0  0.8  2.01 
1975–1979 36.4  157.8  107.3  58.3  23.9  6.9  0.5  1.96 
1980–1984 44.5  161.9  108.6  57.0  21.4  4.2  0.4  1.99 
1985–1989 49.0  166.7  114.6  61.8  24.9  5.1  0.2  2.11 
1990–1994  51.9  135.7 76.2 36.8 14.4  3.2  0.2  1.59 
1995–1999  37.0  102.2 66.6 31.5 11.0  2.2  0.1  1.25 
2000–2004  27.5 94.1 74.1 40.9 14.5  2.6  0.1  1.28 
 
Source: Zakharov 2006c. 
Note: *Per one woman. Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Table A11:  Mean age of women at childbearing and contribution of age groups to  
  PTFR, Russia: 1895–2004  
 
Years 
Mean age at 
Childbearing  Contribution of age groups (in %):  Total 
   15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49   
1895–1899  31.6  3.3 17.6 23.9 24.2 15.8 10.6  4.5 100.0 
1900–1904  31.6  3.2 17.7 24.0 24.2 15.8 10.6  4.5 100.0 
1905–1909  31.8  3.2 16.2 24.4 24.6 16.1 10.9  4.6 100.0 
1910–1914  31.8  3.2 16.4 23.3 25.1 16.3 11.0  4.7 100.0 
1915–1919  31.5  3.2 18.4 23.4 25.1 15.2 10.3  4.4 100.0 
1920–1924  31.7  2.9 17.9 23.5 23.6 16.4 11.0  4.7 100.0 
1925–1929  31.7  2.9 18.0 23.7 23.3 16.3 10.7  5.1 100.0 
1930–1934  31.7  3.6 18.8 22.6 20.8 18.3 10.2  5.7 100.0 
1935–1939  31.2  3.8 20.2 24.3 19.6 17.4 10.4  4.3 100.0 
1940–1944  31.5  3.6 19.2 22.8 21.7 16.9 11.7  4.1 100.0 
1945–1949  30.1  3.5 24.3 26.8 19.5 15.7  7.9  2.3 100.0 
1950–1954  29.3  2.7 25.4 32.5 19.6 12.3  6.3  1.2 100.0 
1955–1959  28.7  4.3 27.0 30.2 21.8 12.0  4.1  0.6 100.0 
1960–1964  27.9  5.1 32.5 29.7 19.0 10.1  3.2  0.4 100.0 
1965–1969  27.4  6.1 35.7 28.0 18.4  8.7  2.8  0.3 100.0 
1970–1974  26.8  7.6 38.1 27.9 16.2  8.0  2.0  0.2 100.0 
1975–1979  26.2  9.3 40.3 27.4 14.8  6.1  1.8  0.1 100.0 
1980–1984  25.8 11.1 40.7 27.3 14.3  5.4  1.1  0.1 100.0 
1985–1989  25.9 11.6 39.5 27.1 14.6  5.9  1.2  0.1 100.0 
1990–1994  24.9 16.3 42.6 23.9 11.6  4.5  1.0  0.1 100.0 
1995–1999  25.2 14.8 40.8 26.6 12.6  4.4  0.8  0.0 100.0 
2000–2004  26.1 10.8 37.1 29.2 16.1  5.7  1.0  0.1 100.0 
 
Source: Zakharov 2006c. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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Table A12:  Completed cohort fertility and contribution of mothers under age 26.  
  Russia and 26 economically developed countries, female birth cohorts  
  1930–1931 to 1960–1961  
 
  Completed cohort fertility** 
Contribution of mothers under 26 to the 


















The  Netherlands  2.65 2.20 1.89 1.84 31.3 48.2 48.4 30.6 
Switzerland  2.18 2.06 1.79 1.77 36.4 51.8 47.9 35.0 
Japan  2.40 2.01 2.02 1.80 51.8 47.5 48.4 37.2 
Sweden  2.13 2.04 2.00 2.02 52.2 59.3 52.5 39.2 
Finland  2.43 2.00 1.86 1.94 51.8 61.9 51.0 39.2 
Denmark  2.36 2.23 1.90 1.89 56.3 65.0 60.0 40.2 
Germany  (West.)  2.16 1.94 1.69 1.59 43.0 57.0 55.5 41.5 
Australia  3.08 2.75 2.33 2.11 51.3 60.6 57.9 43.4 
Norway  2.51 2.43 2.09 2.09 46.1 61.3 60.3 43.6 
Belgium  2.29 2.15 1.82 1.83 43.9 57.5 56.5 45.0 
France  2.63 2.39 2.11 2.09 48.4 56.2 55.6 45.9 
Spain  2.61 2.58 2.10 1.73  …  … 51.8 45.1 
Italy  2.28 2.14 1.88 1.63 39.0 48.6 55.9 46.0 
New  Zeland  3.33 3.12 2.55 2.33 49.1 63.8 64.2 46.7 
England  and  Wales  2.34 2.38 2.05 1.94 47.4 62.5 56.1 46.8 
USA  3.20 2.68 2.01 2.02 59.9 71.2 59.8 52.6 
Austria  2.35 2.05 1.84 1.67 44.1 60.1 62.0 53.3 
Portugal  2.94 2.62 2.07 1.89 39.7 48.6 57.5 56.1 
Greece  … 2.03 2.06 1.91  …  … 61.1 61.9 
Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia  2.48 2.37 2.26 2.25  … 62.5 64.0 62.6 
Hungary  2.07 1.92 1.95 2.02 65.7 62.7 68.7 65.3 
Russia  2.18 1.93 1.88 1.81 54.5 59.1 62.3 71.8 
Slovakia  2.86 2.52 2.30 2.17 60.3 66.8 69.2 72.0 
Germany  (East)  2.21 1.97 1.80 1.80  … 68.1 70.0 74.0 
Czech  Republic  2.14 2.06 2.10 2.01 68.9 71.1 73.8 74.6 
Romania  … 2.42 2.41 2.12  … 56.3 69.4 75.0 
Bulgaria  2.09 2.08 2.04 1.90 69.2 73.4 77.9 81.0 
 
Source: Recent demographic developments in Europe. 2000–2001. Council of Europe. Strasbourg; Frejka T., Calot G. Cohort 
reproductive patterns in low-fertility countries //Population and Development Review, Vol.27(1). 2001. P.103–132; Frejka T., 
Calot G. Cohort childbearing age patterns in low-fertility countries in the late 20
th century: Is the postponement of births an 
inherent element? Paper presented at the IUSSP Seminar “International Perspectives on Low Fertility: Trends, Theories and 
Policies”. Tokyo, 21–23 March 2001. Also, calculations by author. 
Note: * The countries are listed in ascending order based on contribution of mothers under age 26 to the completed fertility of the 
generation born in 1960–1961. 
** Average number of children live born to a woman by age 50. Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Table A13:  Women in formal and informal unions according to 2002 Census,  
  1994 Microcensus, and Russian GGS (2004)  
 
 
Per 1,000 women at age: 
  18–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 
Microcensus,  1994        
All  “married”  237 565 751 799 797 771 
Registered  marriage  210 527 707 753 748 722 
Unregistered  marriage  27 38 44 46 49 49 
Proportion of women in informal 
unions,  %  11.4  6.7 5.9 5.8 6.1 6.4 
Census, 2002        
All  “married”  123 423 654 706 724 721 
Registered  marriage  83  343 561 623 657 663 
Unregistered  marriage  40 80 93 83 67 58 
Proportion of women in informal 
unions,  %  32.6 19.0 14.2 11,8 9.3  8.0 
GGS, 2004        
All in partnership*  201  478  757  776  766  755 
Marriage*  77  334 614 622 638 664 
Cohabitation*  123 143 144 154 128 92 
Proportion of women in informal 
unions,  %  61.5 30,1 19,0 19,9 16,7 12,1 
 
Source: Microcensus, 1994: (1995) Состояние в браке и рождаемость в России (по данным микропереписи населения 1994 
г.). State Commission on Statistics of Russia. Мoscow; Census, 2002: (2004) Итоги Всероссийской переписи населения 
2002 г., Т.2 Возрастно-половой состав и состояние в браке. Federal State Statistics Service. Moscow; GGS, 2004: Author’s 
calculations.  
Note: *Partners are living together in one household. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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Table A14:  Cumulative cohort fertility by specified ages per woman: Russia,  
  female birth cohorts 1949–50, 1954–55, 1959–60, 1964–65, 1969–1986  
 
Birth 
cohort  By age 20  By age 25  By age 30  By age 35  By age 40  By age 45  By age 50 
1949–50  0.15 0.92 1.45 1.73  1.85  1.87  1.87 
1954–55  0.17 0.95 1.49 1.81  1.88  1.89  1.90 
1959–60  0.19 1.02 1.60 1.79  1.85  1.86 1.86* 
1964–65  0.21 1.04 1.43 1.58  1.65 1.67*   
1969–70  0.26 0.94 1.27 1.47 1.57*     
1970–71  0.26 0.90 1.23 1.43       
1971–72  0.27 0.86 1.19         
1972–73  0.26 0.82 1.16         
1973–74  0.25 0.81 1.16         
1974–75  0.25 0.77 1.14         
1975–76  0.23 0.74 1.12         
1976–77 0.22  0.70         
1977–78 0.20  0.68         
1978–79 0.18  0.67         
1979–80 0.17  0.65         
1980–81 0.15  0.62         
1981–82 0.14          
1982–83 0.14          
1983–84 0.14          
1984–85 0.13          
1985–86 0.13          
 
Source: Author’s estimates based on official birth registration statistics. 
Note: **Preliminary estimate using data up to 2005. Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Table A15:  Age-specific birth rates and Total Fertility Rate, Russia: 1980, 1990– 
 2006   
 
Year  Age-specific birth rates (per 1,000 women)  TFR 
  15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49  
1980  43.7 157.8 100.8 52.1 17.4 4.9 0.4 1.89 
1990  55.0  156.5 93.1 48.2 19.4  4.2  0.2  1.89 
1991  54.2  145.9 82.7 41.5 16.5  3.7  0.2  1.73 
1992  50.7  132.9 72.3 34.9 13.9  3.2  0.2  1.55 
1993  47.3  119.1 63.7 28.8 11.0  2.5  0.2  1.37 
1994    49.1  119.4 66.8 29.4 10.6  2.3  0.1  1.39 
1995    44.8  112.7 66.5 29.5 10.6  2.2  0.1  1.34 
1996 38.9  105.5  65.5 30.1 10.8 2.3 0.1 1.27 
1997  35.8 98.0 64.8 31.2 10.8 2.2 0.1 1.22 
1998  33.5 98.1 66.6 33.1 11.5 2.3 0.1 1.23 
1999  28.9 91,8 63.7 32.2 11.1 2.2 0.1 1.16 
2000  27.4 93.6 67.3 35.2 11.8 2.4 0.1 1.20 
2001  27.3 93.1 70.2 38.0 12.9 2.4 0.1 1.22 
2002  27.4 95.8 75.1 41.8 14.7 2.6 0.1 1.29 
2003  27.6 95.1 78.3 44.1 16.0 2.7 0.1 1.32 
2004  28.2 93.4 80.2 45.9 17.6 2.9 0.1 1.34 
2005  27.5 86.8 77.9 45.5 17.8 3.0 0.2 1.29 
2006  28.6 85.8 78.2 46.8 18.7 3.1 0.2 1.30 
 
Source: (2006) The Demographic Yearbook of Russia. Federal State Statistics Service. Moscow. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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Table A16:  Contribution by age to TFR (%), Russia: 1980, 1990–2006  
 
 Age  groups 
Year  Under 20   20–24  25–29  30–34  35 and over  Total 
1980   11.6   41.3   26.7   13.8   6.0   100.0  
1990   14.6   41.6   24.7   12.8   6.3   100.0  
1991   15.7   42.3   24.1   12.0   5.9   100.0  
1992   16.4   43.1   23.6   11.3   5.6   100.0  
1993   17.4   43.7   23.4   10.6   4.9   100.0  
1994   17.7   43.0   24.0   10.6   4.7   100.0  
1995   16.8   42.3   24.9   11.1   4.9   100.0  
1996   15.4   41.7   25.8   11.9   5.2   100.0  
1997   14.7   40.4   26.7   12.8   5.4   100.0  
1998   13.7   40.0   27.2   13.5   5.6   100.0  
1999  12.6  39.9  27.7 13.9 5.9  100.0 
2000  11.5  39.3  28.3 14.8 6.1  100.0 
2001  11.2  38.2  28.8 15.5 6.3  100.0 
2002  10.6  37.2  29.2 16.2 6.8  100.0 
2003  10.5  36.0  29.7 16.7 7.1  100.0 
2004  10.5  34.8  29.9 17.1 7.7  100.0 
2005  10.6  33.6  30.1 17.6 8.1  100.0 
2006  10.9  32.8  30.0 17.9 8.4  100.0 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations  Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Table A17:  Mean age of men and women at registration of marriage (for those  
  who married under 50 years of age), Russia: 1980–2004  
 
Year  All marriages  First marriages 
 Men  Women  Men  Women 
1980  26.3  24.3 24.3 22.4 
1981  26.4  24.4 24.4 22.4 
1982  26.4  24.4 24.3 22.4 
1983  26.4  24.4 24.3 22.3 
1984  26.4  24.4 24.1 22.2 
1985  26.5  24.5 24.2 22.2 
1986  26.9  24.8 24.3 22.3 
1987  27.0  24.9 24.4 22.3 
1988  26.9  24.8 24.3 22.2 
1989  26.5  24.5 24.1 22.0 
1990  26.2  24.1 24.0 21.9 
1991  26.2  24.2 24.0 21.8 
1992  26.3  24.2 23.9 21.7 
1993  26.2  24.1 23.9 21.7 
1994  26.4  24.4 24.0 21.8 
1995  26.6  24.6 24.2 22.0 
1996  26.9  24.8 24.4 22.2 
1997  27.0  24.9 24.5 22.3 
1998  27.1  25.0 24.7 22.3 
1999  27.3  25.1 24.9 22.5 
2000  27.6  25.4 25.1 22.6 
2001  27.9  25.6 25.4 22.8 
2002  28.2  25.8 25.7 23.0 
2003  28.4  25.8 25.8 23.1 
2004  28.7  26.1 26.1 23.3 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on official statistics of marriages: before 1997 one-year-age marriage rates were used, since 
1997 – rough estimates based on rates for –18, 18–24, 25–34, 35+ age groups (Since 1997 the Russian statistical agency uses 
only these unconventional age groups for tabulations). Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 24 
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Table A18:  Mean age of women at birth by order, Russia: 1979–2006  
 
Year All  births  1
st birth  2
nd birth 3
rd birth 4
th birth  5
th+ birth 
1979  25.79 23.03 27.41 30.14 32.02 35.61 
1980  25.67 22.99 27.33 30.07 31.81 35.49 
1985  25.78 22.92 27.13 30.04 31.53 34.56 
1990  25.24 22.65 26.86 29.95 31.64 34.38 
1995  24.79 22.67 26.91 29.85 31.55 34.29 
2000*  25.76 23.54 27.88 30.88 32.48 34.57 
2005*  26.56 24.12 28.94 31.62 33.01 34.96 
2006*  26.64 24.21 29.08 31.71 33.13 34.99 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on official birth registration statistics. 
Note: *Estimates based on incomplete data are only for territories where local statistical agencies continue to tabulate data by single-
age groups and birth order (for different years, tabulations cover from 63 to 75% of total births).  
 
 
Table A19:  Selected period total fertility indicators, Russia: 1979–2006  
 
  Conventional period TFR by order of birth    





1979 1.868  0.966  0.634 0.149 0.051 0.068 1.764 … 
1980 1.866  0.967  0.643 0.147 0.048 0.061 1.742 1.801 
1985 2.051  0.964  0.758 0.214 0.060 0.055 1.801 2.090 
1990 1.893  0.995  0.624 0.178 0.052 0.045 1.717 1.711 
1995 1.337  0.802  0.387 0.098 0.029 0.021 1.580 1.625 
2000* 1.195  0.701  0.358 0.092 0.026 0.018 1.593 1.509 
2004* 1.340  0.769  0.420 0.105 0.029 0.018 1.602 1.561 
2005* 1.287  0.737  0.405 0.100 0.028 0.017 1.601 … 
2006* 1.296  0.746  0.407 0.100 0.027 0.016 1.592 … 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on official birth registration statistics. 
Note: * Estimates based on incomplete data are only for territories where local statistical agencies continue to tabulate data by 
single-age groups and birth order (for different years, tabulations cover from 63 to 75% of total births).  Zakharov: Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition 
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Table A20:  Proportion of non-marital births: Russia, 1980, 1990, 1995–2006  
 
Per 100 mothers of each age group 
Year All  ages,%  15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 
1980 10.8  18.7 7.9  9.4  13.5 21.5 23.8 23.1 
1990 14.6  20.2 11.0 11.8 17.3 25.5 34.8 36.5 
1995 21.1  27.0 17.6 18.9 22.9 30.2 36.5 35.8 
2000 28.0  41.0 25.6 24.7 26.4 31.2 34.9 36.8 
2005 30.0  48.4 28.9 25.5 26.9 30.5 34.0 33.2 
2006 29.2  47.2 28.2 24.6 26.4 29.9 34.2 34.1 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on official statistics. 
 
 
Table A21:  Age-specific abortion rates per 1000 women of specified age group,  
  and Total Abortion Rate per woman, Russia: 1991–2004  
 
Year  15–19 20–34 35+  15–44 15–49 TAR  TAR† 
1991  70  153 51  109 100 3.4  2.6 
1992 68 149  44 103  95 3.2  2.4 
1993 67 141  42 98 89 3.1  2.3 
1994 64 135  37 92 82 2.9  2.2 
1995 57 122  33 83 73 2.6  2.0 
1996 51 120  30 80 69 2.5  1.9 
1997 47 113  29 75 64 2.4  1.8 
1998 43 106  27 70 60 2.2  1.7 
1999 37 99 25 65 56 2.1  1.5 
2000 36 98 24 64 54 2.0  1.5 
2001 34 91 22 60 51 1.9  1.4 
2002 33 87 21 58 49 1.8  1.3 
2003 31 82 20 56 47 1.7  … 
2004 30 79 20 54 46 1.6  … 
2005 29 75 19 53 44 1.5  … 
2006 29 66 18 48 40 1.4  … 
2001/1991  0.49 0.60 0.44 0.55 0.51 0.55 0.54 
2006/1991  0.41 0.43 0.35 0.44 0.40 0.41 … 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on official statistics.   
Note: TAR - Total Abortion Rate based on all abortions officially registered in the Russian Federation (including ‘mini’-abortions by 
vacuum aspiration method performed up to 7
th week of pregnancy, without hospitalization); TAR† - Total Abortion Rate, where 
‘mini’-abortions are excluded. 